

11 Oct 46

Record of Proceedings
of the
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST

Court House of the Tribunal
War Ministry Building
Tokyo, Japan

The United States of America, the Republic of China,
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Commonwealth of
Australia, Canada, the Republic of France, the Kingdom of
the Netherlands, New Zealand, India, and the Commonwealth
of the Philippines

-Against-

ARAKI, Sadao; DOHIHARA, Kenji; HASHIMOTO,
Kingo; HATA, Shunroku; HIRANUMA, Kiichiro; HIRO-
TA, Koki; HOSHINO, Naoki; ITAGAKI, Seishiro; KAYA,
Okinori; KIDO, Koichi; KIMURA, Heitaro; KOISO, Kuni-
aki; MATSUI, Iwane; MATSUOKA, Yosuke; MINAMI,
Jiro; MUTO, Akira; NAGANO, Osami; OKA, Takasumi;
OKAWA, Shumei; OSHIMA, Hiroshi; SATO, Kenryo; SHI-
GEMITSU, Mamoru; SHIMADA, Shigetaro; SHIRATO-
RI, Toshio; SUZUKI, Teiichi; TOGO, Shigenori; TOJO,
Hideki; UMEZU, Youshijiro;

-Accused-

Official Court Reporters

Jack Greenberg, Chief
Fred T. Abram
James F. Barton
Antoinette Duda
Samuel Goldberg
Robert B. Morse
John J. Smith
Daphne Spratt
Elvira Whalen
Julian Wolf
Lorraine Yelden

11 OCTOBER 1946

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" " Mr. Furness

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Redirect by Mr. Golunsky

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defense, has no certificate or statement of origin

1 Friday, 11 October, 1946

2 - - -

3 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
4 FOR THE FAR EAST
5 Court House of the Tribunal
6 War Ministry Building
7 Tokyo, Japan

8 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
9 at 0930.

10 - - -

11
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13 Appearances:

14 For the Tribunal, same as before.

15 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

16 For the Defense Section, same as before.

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20 (English to Japanese, Japanese to
21 English, Russian to English and Japanese to
22 Russian interpretation was made by the
23 Language Section, IMTFE.)
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Major Moore.

4 LANGUAGE ARBITER (Major Moore): If the
5 Tribunal please, referring to document No. 1984,
6 exhibit No. 705, page 4, paragraph seven, line two:
7 The word "aggression" should be changed to "attack."
8 We recommend that this correction be made.

9 THE PRESIDENT: Adopted.

10 Colonel Ivanov.

11 COLONEL IVANOV: I present to the Tribunal
12 prosecution document No. 2073, information "On the
13 Organization of the Kwantung Army Divisions," which
14 shows that the organization of the Kwantung Army
15 division had its own characteristics.

16 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

17 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
18 No. 2073 will have exhibit No. 707.

19 (Whereupon, the document above
20 mentioned was marked prosecution's exhibit
21 No. 707 and received in evidence.)

22 MR. BLAKENEY: If the Tribunal please --

23 THE PRESIDENT: Major Blakeney.

24 MR. BLAKENEY: This document, as served on
25 defense, has no certificate or statement of origin

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22 MR. BLAKENEY: If the Tribunal please --

23 THE PRESIDENT: Major Blakeney.

24 MR. BLAKENEY: This document, as served on
25 defense, has no certificate or statement of origin

1 whatsoever, of any nature.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Well, the condition applies.

3 MR. GOLUNSKY: If the Tribunal please, this
4 report shows on the face of it that it has been is-
5 sued by the Red Army General Staff and, under
6 Article 13 of the Charter, doesn't require any cer-
7 tificate of authenticity. That is evident if you
8 look at the end of the document on page 2 where the
9 signature is.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Well, read it.

11 COLONEL IVANOV: I quote paragraph two on
12 page 1 of the English text:

13 "The number of personnel and the armament
14 of the reinforced Division of the Kwantung Army was
15 twice as much as that of a normal Japanese Infantry
16 Division."

17 This evidence is given in the comparative
18 table of number and equipment of reinforced infantry
19 divisions and that of ordinary strength presented to
20 the Tribunal.

21 As can be seen from this table the rein-
22 forced division consisted of type "A" (3d column in
23 the English text of the table), 24,600 men strong
24 and type "A-1" (2d column in the English text)
25 29,400, whilst the ordinary division was 13-16 thous-

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22 forced division consisted of type "A" (3d column in
23 the English text of the table), 24,600 men strong
24 and type "A-1" (2d column in the English text)
25 29,400, whilst the ordinary division was 13-16 thous-

1 and men strong. (This figure is given in the last,
2 i.e. 4th column of the English text of the table).

3 It is seen from another table given in the
4 document that the Kwantung Army had 17 of the total
5 number of 24 reinforced infantry divisions of the
6 type "A" and "A-1" which were in the whole Japanese
7 Army.

8 As can be seen from the document "These
9 divisions were stationed in the areas bordering on
10 the U.S.S.R. in the most important operation direct-
11 ions."

12 I offer in evidence prosecution document
13 No. 2236, the table of the increase of the technical
14 equipment of the Kwantung Army in 1932-1945. This is
15 also a document from the Red Army General Staff.

16 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

17 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
18 No. 2236 will receive exhibit No. 708.

19 (Whereupon, the document above
20 mentioned was marked prosecution's exhibit
21 No. 708 and received in evidence.)

22 COLONEL IVANOV: The data on tank and artil-
23 lery units given in this table shows what a great
24 number of such units armed with the most threatening
25 weapons of the World War II destined for the use in

1 the attack against the U.S.S.R. was concentrated in
2 Manchuria, even when Japan needed them badly in the
3 south.

4 In the table (horizontal column 4 and vertic-
5 ally column 4 and 5), it is pointed out that in 1937
6 Japan had 4 separate tank regiments of which 2 were
7 in the Kwantung Army. As it is shown in horizontal
8 column 2 and vertical columns 6 and 7, in 1942 two
9 tank groups were formed in the Japanese Army and
10 stationed in Manchuria. As can be seen from hori-
11 zontal column 1 and vertical columns 8 and 9, in
12 1943 three tank divisions were formed in the Japan-
13 ese Army and all of these divisions were included in
14 the Kwantung Army.

15 It is pointed out in the horizontal column 5
16 that in 1932 the Kwantung Army had only two G.H.Q.
17 Reserve Artillery Regiments, in 1937 it had 7 regi-
18 ments, in 1942 it had 18 regiments and in 1943 it had
19 20 out of 46 G.H.Q. Reserve Artillery Regiments in
20 the whole Japanese Army.

21 I present prosecution document No. 2130
22 which contains the information on the troops of the
23 puppet governments created by the Japanese in Man-
24 churia and Inner Mongolia. This is a document of the
25 General Staff of the Soviet Red Army.

1 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

2 MR. LOGAN: This exhibit has a map attached
3 to it dated 1945. As I understand the Indictment and
4 the statements of the prosecutor at the commencement
5 of this phase, there is no claim, and there can be
6 none, that Japan attacked Russia in 1945, so that the
7 stationing of the Army of Manchoukuo in 1945 would be
8 immaterial to any issue in this case. Furthermore,
9 this exhibit, together with the previous exhibits
10 which have just been put in evidence, it seems to us,
11 go into a great deal of detail which is not necessary
12 in presentation of this phase of the case. It would
13 be cluttering the record with a great deal of irrele-
14 vant and immaterial matters which are not necessary
15 for the determination of the issues involved.

16 THE PRESIDENT: Well, one charge is con-
17 spiracy to wage an aggressive war, and the steps
18 taken in pursuance of any such conspiracy may be
19 given in evidence. I understand this evidence of
20 such steps, although taken as late as 1945.

21 Objection is overruled.

22 I have a very pertinent inquiry coming from
23 one of my colleagues. We would like to know, of
24 course, where the Red Army got this information about
25 the Japanese Armies in Manchuria. It would be more

1 convincing if it came from Japanese sources.

2 MR. GOLUNSKY: If the Tribunal please, we
3 have a certificate of the General Staff of the Red
4 Army stating that the data contained in all those
5 reports have been acquired by the General Staff,
6 partly from the data which has been collected during
7 the occupation of Manchuria by the Red Army and
8 partly by the Red Army Intelligence Service. I can
9 now hand the certificates over to the Tribunal.

10 (Whereupon, the papers above re-
11 ferred to were handed to the President).

12 THE PRESIDENT: We can look at it only if
13 tendered in evidence; and then, of course, the rules
14 bear on that.

15 MR. BLAKENEY: We have no objection to its
16 being tendered in evidence at this time.

17 MR. GOLUNSKY: I tender it in evidence.

18 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted. It must be marked
19 as an exhibit, but it has no prosecution number.

20 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's documents
21 without number, which have just been tendered, will
22 receive exhibit No. 709.

23 (Whereupon, the papers above men-
24 tioned were marked prosecution's exhibit
25 No. 709 and received in evidence.)

1 MR. FURNESS: We do request copies be fur-
2 nished us in the next day or so.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Is there any particular
4 feature of exhibit 709 the prosecution desire to
5 point out?

6 COLONEL IVANOV: We limit ourselves to pre-
7 sentation of this document in evidence and shall have
8 nothing to say on this document more.

9 MR. BLAKENEY: May we request that the cer-
10 tificate be read into the record?

11 COLONEL IVANOV: If the defense want it, I
12 shall read the text of this document.

13 THE PRESIDENT: Read it.

14 COLONEL IVANOV: In the left upper corner of
15 document it says, "Ministry of the U.S.S.R. Armed
16 Forces - General Staff - No. 102 - Moscow. Certifi-
17 cate given by the General Staff of the U.S.S.R. Armed
18 Forces."

19 I quote the text: Hereby it is certified
20 that the following reports of the Red Army General
21 Staff, dated January 30, 1946, were drawn up on the
22 basis of reconnaissance information of the General
23 Staff and also on the basis of reports received from
24 commanding officers of field units and formations of
25 the Red Army, which were in Manchuria in 1945, i.e.,

1 at the time of the occupation of Manchuria by the
2 Red Army Units."

3 There follows the list of the documents.
4 Your Honor, I should like to ask you whether I should
5 read the whole list of documents listed here. These
6 documents shall be named by me in the future when I
7 shall present them separately.

8 THE PRESIDENT: You propose to present all
9 of those documents?

10 COLONEL IVANOV: Yes. All these documents
11 shall be presented by us. We quote only small ex-
12 cerpts from them.

13 THE PRESIDENT: Will the separate documents
14 or excerpts contain all the information that is now
15 in the certificate as to the origin?

16 COLONEL IVANOV: Yes, your Honor. All this
17 data contains this information.

18 THE PRESIDENT: Well, nothing is to be gained
19 by setting out the certificate at length in the tran-
20 script of the record. Do the defense insist on the
21 transcript being cluttered up with this certificate
22 which I say is unnecessary?

23 MR. BLAKENEY: We do not insist on the read-
24 ing of the titles.

25 THE PRESIDENT: When this question arose,

1 you were dealing with the report concerning puppet
2 troops created by the Japanese in Manchuria and Inner
3 Mongolia. You had offered it in evidence. It is
4 admitted on the usual terms.

5 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
6 No. 2130 will now be given exhibit No. 710. The
7 number of the document as previously marked was 709.
8 A correction will be made.

9 (Whereupon, the document above
10 mentioned was marked prosecution's exhibit
11 No. 709 and received in evidence.)

12 COLONEL IVANOV: From this document it is
13 clear that since 1932 the Japanese started creating
14 an army of the so-called state of Manchoukuo, which
15 was to help the Kwantung Army in a war against the
16 U.S.S.R..

17 In 1945 the Army of Manchoukuo was 178,000
18 strong with 800 pieces of ordnance and 100 planes.
19 By that time the Army of the Inner Mongolia was
20 12,000 men strong.

21 We have likewise presented to the Tribunal
22 a map of dislocation of the Army of Manchoukuo in
23 1945.

24 I now tender in evidence prosecution docu-
25 ment No. 1879, the table of the growth of the Sungar*

1 River war flotilla during the period of 1931 to 1945.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

3 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
4 1879 will receive exhibit No. 711.

5 (Whereupon, the document above
6 mentioned was marked prosecution's exhibit
7 No. 711 and received in evidence.)

8 COLONEL IVANOV: Simultaneously with the in-
9 crease of the land forces in Manchuria Japan increased
10 her Sungari River flotilla subordinated to the Kwan-
11 tung Army.

12 From the 1st horizontal column of this table,
13 it is seen that in 1931 there was only one Japanese
14 warship with the crew sixty men strong on the Sung-
15 ari River. The 2nd column of the table shows that
16 in the period of 1935-37 the flotilla increased up
17 to twenty-eight warships and, in 1941, up to ninety-
18 eight warships with the personnel of 2500 men strong.

19 I offer in evidence prosecution document No.
20 2151 which contains information on the growth of the
21 network of railroads and highways in Manchuria during
22 the period of 1931 to 1945. The document is being
23 offered to establish the fact that for the purpose
24 of creation of military base against the U.S.S.R.,
25 Japan started intensive construction of railroads and

1 highways in Manchuria since 1931.

2 Outline maps of the railroads of Manchuria
3 for 1931-36 and 1945 are attached to this document,
4 and copies of them were served upon the defense. I
5 ask your Honor to allow me to demonstrate enlarged
6 charts for the convenience of the Court. They con-
7 tain the data given in the document and might be
8 useful as a visual illustration.

9 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual
10 terms.

11 At some stage or other those wall maps
12 should be tendered. In fact, they should be marked
13 at once.

14 COLONEL IVANOV: These are the same maps
15 that have been presented to the Tribunal and to the
16 defense -- photo copies of them.

17 THE PRESIDENT: These are quite distinct.
18 These are not photo copies -- these things on the
19 wall, I mean. I know we are looking at copies. That
20 is what we have been provided with. We do not look
21 at the originals. But those maps on the wall are
22 quite distinct.

23 However, proceed with the reading of the
24 exhibit.

25 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document

1 No. 2151 will receive exhibit No. 712.

2 (Whereupon, the document above
3 mentioned was marked prosecution's exhibit
4 No. 712 and received in evidence.)

5 COLONEL IVANOV: I quote the document:

6 "At the time of the Japanese occupation in
7 1931 the whole network of railways in Manchuria was
8 6,140 km. in length (including the Chinese Eastern
9 Railroad).

10 "There were no automobile roads in Man-
11 churia, except in the Kwantung region where there
12 were several dozens of kilometers of asphalt auto-
13 mobile roads."

14 I omit the end of this paragraph and quote
15 further:
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1 "By 1936 the railroad network of Manchuria
2 was already 8.336 km. in length, and the directions
3 of the newly built railroad-lines and railroad lines
4 in process of construction showed clearly aggressive
5 nature of these constructions aimed to equip the Man-
6 churian base with communications against the U.S.S.R.

7 "Thus from 1932 to 1936 there was construc-
8 ted a railway line from the district of Tchangehung
9 through Taran (Bychentzi) to Halun-Arshan (at the
10 frontier of the Mongolian People's Republic),
11 construction of a railway line to the frontier of
12 the U.S.S.R. in Primorye was completed, (Tumin-
13 Mudantzian) Tynkory Dunan, a new railway line was
14 built from the Korean port of Yuki to the town of
15 Tumin other railway lines were being built to other
16 points of the Soviet-Manchurian frontier (Huton, to
17 the lower reaches of the Sungari river, the new road
18 through Mergen to Amur. etc.) It must be stated that
19 all these railroads were of no economic significance,
20 as they passed through thinly populated and unculti-
21 vated districts, where there were no industrial en-
22 terprises and where no enterprises were being built.

23 "Together with the building of railroads,
24 automobile roads were rapidly being built as well.

25 "The network of automobile highways was

1 9,000 km. in length in 1936. The building of auto-
2 mobile roads was mainly accomplished in districts
3 adjacent to the frontier of U.S.S.R. (in Barga, in
4 Primorye, along the Sungari and in the districts
5 near the Soviet Primorye).

6 "By 1941 the length of railroad lines in
7 Manchuria had already reached 10,735km. The rail-
8 road communications in the west were extended: from
9 Halun-Arshan to Handagai, in Priamurje from Nehe to
10 Holunmin (second main line to the Amur), from Boli
11 to Tzyamusi, from Dunan to Hutow. And along the
12 river a railroad from Suihua to Lyantzyankow was
13 built; The building of the second railway line from
14 Mukden to Chanchun was already completed and the con-
15 struction of the second track on lines as Chanchun-
16 Harbin, Harbin-Pogranichnaja, Linkou-Dunan and Mukden-
17 Andun started to develop.

18 "By the end of 1941 the Japanese had built
19 in Manchuria 18,460 km. of automobile highways, and
20 in addition 20,665 km. of local roads were reconstruc-
21 ted and improved. The total length of all auto-truck
22 roads by the beginning of 1942 in Manchuria was about
23 60,000 km.

24 "By the beginning of 1945 the railway net
25 work of Manchuria was about 13,700 km. By this time

1 the Japanese completed the second railroad from Cen-
2 tral Manchuria to the north in Priamurje from Holun-
3 min to Sakhalin and completed laying a second track
4 on the following lines: Chanchun-Harbin, Harbin-
5 Pogranichnaya, Linkow-Dunan, Mukden-Andun, Tumin-
6 Vantzin, continuing the building of a second route
7 from Vantzin to Mudantzyan and from Dunan to Hutow.

8 "The building of automobile roads was per-
9 formed by improving the passability of roads, mainly
10 in districts adjacent to the frontier.

11 "The total length of automobile roads in
12 Manchuria at the beginning of 1945 reached 22,000 km."

13 I would like to draw the Tribunal's atten-
14 tion to these outline maps of railroads which show
15 that the network of railroads in Manchuria was es-
16 pecially thick in the area bordering on Soviet
17 Primorye. As we shall show further, the direction
18 of these ways corresponded to the operation direct-
19 ions worked out in accordance with the operation
20 plans of the Japanese General Staff to open main
21 offensive operations of the Japanese Army against
22 the U.S.S.R.

23 I present prosecution document No. 2134
24 which gives information on the growth of the net-
25 work of airfields in Manchuria during the period

1 of 1931 to 1945.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

3 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
4 No. 2134 will receive exhibit No. 713.

5 (Whereupon, the document above
6 mentioned was marked prosecution's exhibit
7 No. 713 and received in evidence.)
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1 COLONEL IVANOV: I should like you to survey
2 the diagrams of the growth of the airfields system in
3 Manchuria and the maps of the network of airfields
4 presented to the Tribunal, which are being demonstrated
5 in the courtroom and which clearly show intensive
6 growth of airfield system.

7 Now I shall quote this document:

8 "Beginning from 1932 and during the follow-
9 ing years of occupation of Manchuria the Kwantung
10 Army Command undertook a large-scale construction of
11 air-bases, airfields, and landing fields preparing
12 a military base for the operations of the Japanese
13 Air Forces against the U.S.S.R."

14 In the table of the growth of airfield
15 system in Manchuria, presented to the Tribunal,
16 vertical column 3 says that the number of airfields
17 in Manchuria in 1931 was 5, in 1936, 43, in 1941,
18 74. In 1945 it had grown to 116.

19 Taking into account air bases and number of
20 landing grounds, the total number of all airfields
21 as it is seen from the last, that is, the fifth
22 column, amounted to: 5 in 1931, 150 in 1936, 287
23 in 1941, 416 in 1945.

24 I present in evidence prosecution
25 document No. 2148, information on the construction

1 of fortified districts in Manchuria during the period
2 of 1934 - 1945.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

4 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
5 No. 2148 will receive exhibit No. 714.

6 ("Whereupon, the document above
7 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
8 No. 714 and was received in evidence.)

9 COLONEL IVANOV: Maps of fortified districts,
10 also presented to the Tribunal and demonstrated here
11 with the Court's permission, clearly show the progress
12 of construction of fortified districts in different
13 periods.

14 I beg you, Mr. President and Members of the
15 Tribunal, to consider these outline maps.

16 The Kwantung Army Command began to fortify
17 districts in Manchuria in the areas adjacent to the
18 U.S.S.R. frontier in 1934 and was continuously doing
19 it until 1945. The document shows: I quote the
20 first page of the document:

21 "The construction of fortified districts in
22 Manchuria was begun by the commanding authorities of
23 the Kwantung Army in 1934 and was continued through 1945.

24 "The disposition of the fortified districts
25 was clearly indicative of their aggressive nature

1 of fortified districts in Manchuria during the period
2 of 1934 - 1945.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

4 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
5 No. 2148 will receive exhibit No. 714.

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25 was clearly indicative of their aggressive nature

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17 districts in Manchuria in the areas adjacent to the
18 U.S.S.R. frontier in 1934 and was continuously doing
19 it until 1945. The document shows: I quote the
20 first page of the document:

21 "The construction of fortified districts in
22 Manchuria was begun by the commanding authorities of
23 the Kwantung Army in 1934 and was continued through 1945.

24 "The disposition of the fortified districts
25 was clearly indicative of their aggressive nature

1 because all of them were shallow in depth and were
2 built in Zones facing directions leading to very
3 important operation objectives on the Soviet territory.

4 "From 1934 to 1937, seven fortified districts
5 were built, extending 150 km. along the frontier and
6 including 300 permanent fortifications for different
7 purposes.

8 "From 1937 to 1940 the construction was
9 extended over additional frontier districts, with
10 general length of 300 km. and 800 different permanent
11 fortifications were built. By 1941, 13 fortified
12 districts had been constructed, extending more than
13 700 km. along the front. The total number of per-
14 manent fortifications was more than 1200.

15 "From 1941 to 1945 there was further improve-
16 ment of old, and construction of new, fortified dis-
17 tricts. By 1945 had been constructed 17 fortified
18 districts on the frontier of the Soviet Union and in
19 the immediate rear of it.

20 "The total length of fortified zone along
21 the state frontier of Manchuria in 1945 was about
22 800 km. where there were built more than 4,500 perman-
23 ent fortifications."

24 The summary table presented to the Tribunal
25 contains a list of all 17 fortified districts created

1 in Manchuria, the year when they were set up, the
2 number of installations they have, and their length
3 along the front and in depth.

4 I offer in evidence prosecution document
5 No. 1877 which contains information on construction
6 of military dumps in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945.
7 The data given in this document and the maps of the
8 location of military dumps in Manchuria in 1931, 1936
9 and 1941-1945 presented to the Tribunal, two of which
10 are demonstrated here in an enlarged form.

11 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

12 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
13 No. 1877 will receive exhibit No. 715.

14 (Whereupon, the document above referred
15 to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 715 and
16 was received in evidence.)

17 COLONEL IVANOV: Along with the growth of
18 number of Japanese troops in Manchuria grew the con-
19 struction of military dumps in the frontier area, and
20 this provided for the concentration of large supplies
21 of ammunition and war materials. I quote some excerpts
22 from the document:

23 "Before the occupation in 1931 there were ;
24 only seven military dumps in Manchuria."

25 I skip several paragraphs and quote paragraph

1 in Manchuria, the year when they were set up, the
2 number of installations they have, and their length
3 along the front and in depth.

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5 No. 1877 which contains information on construction
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8 location of military dumps in Manchuria in 1931, 1936
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19 struction of military dumps in the frontier area, and
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21 of ammunition and war materials. I quote some excerpts
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18 number of Japanese troops in Manchuria grew the con-
19 struction of military dumps in the frontier area, and
20 this provided for the concentration of large supplies
21 of ammunition and war materials. I quote some excerpts
22 from the document:

23 "Before the occupation in 1931 there were
24 only seven military dumps in Manchuria."

25 I skip several paragraphs and quote paragraph

6 on page 1:

1 "By the beginning of 1937 total number of
2 dumps in Manchuria reached 80 with the following
3 capacity. Ammunition dumps - about 30-35 divisional
4 ammunition sets (about 14,000 tons). Bomb dumps -
5 about 7,000 tons. Fuel depots - about 10,500 tons."

6 I shall read paragraph 2 on page 2:

7 "By the beginning of 1945 the number of
8 dumps in Manchuria reached 370 with the following
9 capacity: Ammunition - more than 700 ammunition
10 sets (about 300,000 tons). Air bombs - about 12,000
11 tons. Fuel - about 250,000 tons."

12 I draw the Tribunal's attention to the fact
13 that a greater number of dumps were located in north
14 and eastern Manchuria in the immediate vicinity of
15 the U.S.S.R. frontiers.
16

17 I present prosecution document No. 1881
18 containing the data on the growth of barracks in
19 Manchuria from 1931 to 1945.
20

21 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

22 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
23 No. 1881 will receive exhibit No. 716.

24 (Whereupon, the document above
25 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
No. 716 and was received in evidence.)

COLONEL IVANOV: The maps of barrack construction in Manchuria from 1931, 1936, and 1941-1945 which I bring to the notice of the Court, expressly illustrate this data. As may be seen from this document, 7.5 divisions (100,000 men strong) could be accommodated in Manchuria barracks in 1931, and all the barracks at that time were concentrated in South Manchuria and along the Chinese Eastern Railroad. The document reads: I quote:

"In 1937 the billeting capacity of the Kwantung Army barrack facilities was increased for receiving twelve reinforced infantry divisions, about fifty percent of the whole barrack facilities being built in the districts adjacent to the Soviet Primorye.

"The number of the barracks in Manchuria was increased three times as much from 1937 to 1941.

"In 1941 the billeting capacity of the barrack facilities in Manchuria was already for 39 infantry divisions, from which about 8 divisions were in Western Manchuria and Inner Mongolia; about 8 divisions in the district adjacent to the Amour; about 13 divisions in Eastern Manchuria; about 10 divisions in Central Manchuria -- totally, about 39 divisions (about 800,000 men).

"The main part of the barrack facilities

1 (about 75%) was concentrated in the main operation
2 directions.

3 "During 1941-45 the Japanese command did
4 not cease the construction of new barracks and the
5 enlargement and repair of the old ones.

6 "In 1945 the billeting capacity of the
7 barrack facilities in Manchuria increased up to 55
8 divisions, and under the condition of condensed quar-
9 tering it could have been increased to accommodate
10 17 divisions more.

11 "Creation of large barrack facilities
12 planned for 50-70 divisions (about 1.5 million men)
13 shows that the Kwantung Army was not preparing for a
14 defensive war in Manchuria, but planned large-scale
15 offensive operations against the Soviet Far East."
16

17 I now tender in evidence prosecution document
18 No. 2133 containing information on Japanese military
19 settlements in Manchuria. It is seen from the document
20 that the Japanese colonization policy in Manchuria
21 served mainly for military purposes.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

23 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
24 No. 2133 will receive exhibit No. 717.

25 (Whereupon, the document above
referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit

No. 717 and was received in evidence.)

COLONEL IVANOV: I quote this document:

"In 1932 the Japanese government commenced to colonize Manchuria beginning with districts which were of greatest military importance. The first to settle in Manchuria were reserve men, who had finished the active service in the Army, by means of which was reached the accumulation of personnel for mobilization deployment of the Kwantung Army, with the purpose of preparation of war against the U.S.S.R.

"Militarized camps were organized for settlers where they received three years' training and were used for guard service.

"After the three years' training in camps the settlers quartered in special militarized settlements.

"The main districts of settling the colonists were organized in the areas adjacent to the Soviet Primorye.

"By the beginning of 1936 the whole number of Japanese settlers in Manchuria was above 390,000 men.

"From 1936 to 1940 about 221,000 Japanese arrived in Manchuria, of whom about 150-160 thousand were fit for military service.

1 "By 1945 the whole number of Japanese
2 settlers reached about one million people, of whom
3 the adult men were used to man new divisions of the
4 Kwantung Army in 1945."

5 I present in evidence prosecution document
6 No. 1883 which shows the increase of number of ports
7 in Manchuria and Korea from 1931 to 1945.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

9 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution document
10 No. 1883 will receive exhibit No. 718.

11 (Whereupon, the document above
12 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
13 No. 718 and was received in evidence.)

14 COLONEL IVANOV: If the Tribunal please, I
15 shall not read the contents of this document which
16 shows when and what fishing ports of local importance
17 were reconstructed as seaports used as ports for the
18 landing of troops and as operation and maneuver bases
19 for the Japanese Navy.
20

21 We present documentary evidence, official
22 correspondence of 1937-1938 between General TOJO,
23 Chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters, and General
24 UMEZU, Vice War Minister. Both of them have been
25 brought to justice before this Tribunal and we are
submitting these documents to the Tribunal as one of

1 the proofs of their personal participation in the
2 creation of the Manchurian military base on the one
3 hand, and, on the other, as a proof of the fact that
4 this military base was constructed in a most urgent
5 way.

6 I present for identification prosecution
7 document No. 751, "Manchurian Confidential Files, 1938"
8 and I shall read as evidence extracts from separate
9 documents.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

11 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
12 No. 751 will receive exhibit No. 719 for identification
13 and the excerpt therefrom bearing the same number will
14 receive exhibit No. 719-A.

15 (Whereupon, prosecution's document
16 No. 751 was marked prosecution's exhibit No.
17 719 for identification; the excerpt therefrom
18 bearing the same number was marked prosecution's
19 exhibit No. 719-A and was received in evidence.)

20 COLONEL IVANOV: I quote page 1:

21 "Strictly Confidential -- Plan of Stationing
22 Meteorological Service System in Chahar-Suiyuan --
23 December, 1937 -- Kwantung Army Headquarters."

24 In the section entitled "Object" we read:

25 "Object -- To establish promptly a general

1 and aeronautical meteorological service system in
2 the Mongolia area north of the Inner Great Wall and
3 thus enable more accurate weather forecasting service
4 in Japan and Manchuria and especially to strengthen
5 aeronautical meteorological service system in prepara-
6 tion for a war with Soviet Russia."

7 In the second section entitled "Outline" we
8 read:

9 "For the time being, have them controlled
10 directly by the army and allocate stations by taking
11 into consideration military operations, position of
12 troops and special agencies. Upon completion, grad-
13 ually transfer the control to the local government and
14 make them permanent establishments."

15 I shall read the extract from another document,
16 page 1-a, paragraphs 4-5:

17 Top Secret. "Dispatch 12 January 1938 --
18 KWAN SAN CHI No. 23 addressed to Vice-Chief of the
19 War Office UMEZU, Yoshijiro; by Chief of Staff of the
20 Kwantung Army, TOJO, Hideki; requesting consideration
21 of the establishment of meteorological organs in the
22 Chahar and Mongolia districts."

23 I quote the contents of the document:

24 "Because the new establishment of meteorological
25 observation organs is of vital importance

1 from the standpoint of the China Incident and anti-
2 Soviet strategy, it must be promptly completed based
3 on the plan separately bound. I beg you will immedi-
4 ately consider the following items of the plan in
5 question and understand, furthermore, that after the
6 start of work in the actual place where the troops
7 are stationed in Mongolia, this plan will transfer
8 control to the same troops."

9 Further follows the same information on the
10 problems connected with officers - meteorologists
11 being additionally attached to the headquarters, on
12 the remittance of necessary money as extraordinary
13 military expenditures and on the selection and train-
14 ing of necessary personnel.

15 I shall read the document relating to the
16 so-called extraordinary measures to increase the
17 strength of the Kwantung Army by means of prolonging
18 the term of active service for the soldiers in Man-
19 churia.

20 TOJO, UMEZU, and the Japanese General Staff
21 solved this question in affirmative, as is seen from
22 the documents below. I quote an extract from the
23 document on page 4, paragraph 5:
24

25 "Dispatch 11 January 1938 -- K'AN SAN No.
36,1 -- addressed to the Vice-Chief of War Office

1 UMEZU, Yoshijiro, by the Chief of Staff of the
2 Kwantung Army TOJO, Hideki; pertaining to the ex-
3 tension of military service of troops in Manchuria."
4 Top Secret.

5 I quote the contents of the document:

6 "In view of the purport of the Ordinance
7 No. 41 of the War Ministry, dated September, 1937,
8 I consider that the soldiers in active service be-
9 longing to the units in Manchuria, whose service will
10 expire at the end of February this year, ought to
11 have their services extended according to Ordinance
12 No. 5 of the War Ministry as long as the present sit-
13 uation continues; but I wish to get your unofficial
14 report as early as possible, as this decision has
15 influences upon various matters.

16 "In addition to this, I beg to inform you
17 that it is desirable that the conscripts of 1937 be
18 educated in Manchuria and I believe in the possibility
19 of their accommodation by means of making some sup-
20plementary establishment."

21 Further on in the journal of the War Ministry
22 there is a document: Draft of inquiry, January 25,
23 1938 -- RIKU MAN MITSU, No. 25, addressed to Vice-
24 Chief of Staff by the Vice War Minister with regard to
25 the extension of the term of military service of

1 enlisted men of 1935 belonging to the units in
2 Manchuria. This document is on pages 3-4, last
3 paragraph on page 3 and first paragraph on page 4.
4 I quote an extract:

5 "I beg you to extend for the time being
6 the term of service of the enlisted men of 1935 who
7 enlist in March in units under the commander of the
8 Kwantung Army."

9 On January 27, 1938, the reply of TADA,
10 Chief of General Staff, to UMEZU, Vice War Minister,
11 was received. I quote page 5, paragraph 1:

12 "Reply, 27 January 1938 -- SAN MITSU No.
13 293-2 of Army Dept. in Imperial Headquarters --
14 addressed to the Vice Chief of War Office UMEZU,
15 Yoshijiro, by the Vice Chief of Staff, TADA, Shuui,
16 relating to the extension of military service of the
17 conscripts of 1935 belonging to the units in Manchuria."

18 Similar reply was sent on January 29, 1938,
19 No. 32 by UMEZU, Vice War Minister, to TOJO, Chief
20 of the Kwantung Army Headquarters. I quote an extract
21 from a draft copy of the reply, page 4, paragraphs 3-4:
22

23 "In reply to your inquiry dated 11 January,
24 KWAN SAN #36,1 -- I beg to inform you that the term
25 of service of the enlisted men of 1935 who enlist in
March attached to units under the commander of the

1 Kwantung Army is, for the time being, scheduled to
2 be extended."

3 I call the attention of the Tribunal to
4 the fact that this extraordinary measure was being
5 taken at the time when, as it was shown by my col-
6 league, Mr. Tavenner, the leaders of Japanese aggres-
7 sion were coming to terms with Hitler about the
8 military alliance against the U.S.S.R. It is worth
9 noticing that this measure directly preceded the
10 Japanese attack on the U.S.S.R. territory in the
11 Hassan Lake area. The evidence concerning this
12 attack will be presented by my colleague in prosecu-
13 tion, Major General Tadevasyan.

14 The active part TOJO played in the setting
15 up of fortified districts on the U.S.S.R. frontiers
16 may be seen from the following telegram which I shall
17 bring to the notice of the Court. I quote page 1-a,
18 paragraphs 1-2:

19 "Secret telegram, 11 February 1938 -- No.
20 172, addressed to the Vice Minister and the Vice Chief
21 of the General Staff by the Chief of Staff of Kwantung
22 Army.

23 "The establishment of anti-Soviet fortifica-
24 tions is scheduled to be made during 1938 and 1939 on
25 the spots not yet started as well as the spots regarded

as specially important among the locations of fortifications mentioned in Special Order No. 301.

(Necessary funds will be provided by the Manchukuo budget.) The outline of the plan will be submitted to the General Staff Office within a few days. In order to execute this plan, moreover, since the increased number of men attached is remarkably insufficient in view of the present fortification work, I beg you to inquire immediately into the ways of making the following temporary increases for about two years from March 1938 in the number of men attached."

Further there is an enumeration of additional specialists needed additionally by the Kwantung Army Headquarters for activizing the construction of fortified districts.

Now I offer in evidence prosecution document No. 1046-C, secret telegram No. 700 of the Chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters of May 11, 1938, sent by him to the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry which I present for the purpose of proving that the command of the Kwantung Army attributed an important role to the South Manchurian Railroad Company in preparing operations against the U.S.S.R.

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

1 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
2 No. 1046 will be given exhibit No. 720 for identi-
3 fication only and the excerpt therefrom, to-wit,
4 prosecution's document No. 1046-C will receive
5 exhibit No. 720-A.

6 (Whereupon, prosecution's document
7 No. 1046 was marked prosecution's exhibit No.
8 720 for identification; the excerpt therefrom,
9 prosecution's document No. 1046-C, was marked
10 prosecution's exhibit No. 720-A and was received
11 in evidence.)

12 COLONEL IVANOV: I quote an excerpt from
13 this telegram:

14 "With reference to the donation to the East
15 Asia Research Institute by the South Manchuria Railway
16 Company, we regret to say, as we have already expressed
17 in 'Kwan-san-man' Telegram No. 567, that we cannot
18 agree to it, because it is undesirable to have the
19 South Manchuria Railway Company make the donation from
20 the same standpoint as that of an ordinary private
21 corporation since it is not only a national policy
22 company different from an ordinary private company,
23 but also related to the army in that it is receiving
24 the army's guidance for cooperating in the enforcement
25 of the national policies of Manchukuo and also in the

1 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
2 No. 1046 will be given exhibit No. 720 for identi-
3 fication only and the excerpt therefrom, to-wit,
4 prosecution's document No. 1046-C will receive
5 exhibit No. 720-A.

6 (Whereupon, prosecution's document
7 No. 1046 was marked prosecution's exhibit No.
8 720 for identification; the excerpt therefrom,
9 prosecution's document No. 1046-C, was marked
10 prosecution's exhibit No. 720-A and was received
11 in evidence.)

12 COLONEL IVANOV: I quote an excerpt from
13 this telegram:

14 "With reference to the donation to the East
15 Asia Research Institute by the South Manchuria Railway
16 Company, we regret to say, as we have already expressed
17 in 'Kwan-san-man' Telegram No. 567, that we cannot
18 agree to it, because it is undesirable to have the
19 South Manchuria Railway Company make the donation from
20 the same standpoint as that of an ordinary private
21 corporation since it is not only a national policy
22 company different from an ordinary private company,
23 but also related to the army in that it is receiving
24 the army's guidance for cooperating in the enforcement
25 of the national policies of Manchukuo and also in the

operational preparations, etc. against the Soviet Union."

The problem of state subsidy is considered further in the telegram but it is not of great interest.

I present for identification prosecution document No. 2550, "Top Secret Military-Topographical Data for the Purpose of Landing Operations in the Northern Sea," Volume II, dated March, 1941, published by OTARU Branch of the Shipping Transport Headquarters of the Japanese War Ministry.

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2550 will receive exhibit No. 721 for identification.

(Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 721 for identification.)

COLONEL IVANOV: I shall read in evidence several excerpts from this document. The title of this document, I quote: "Military-Topographical Data for the Purpose of Landing Operations in the Northern Sea," shows the purpose of these military-topographical data. This document contains military-topographical data necessary for landing operations in fifteen districts of the Soviet peninsula Kamchatka,

the seizure of which was planned by the Japanese
General Staff.

I shall not inconvenience the Tribunal by
reading lengthy quotations submitted in evidence
concerning Palana district. In order to show the
contents of each chapter it will be sufficient to
quote the title of paragraphs which are included in
the first chapter. I quote page 1:

"1. Geographical Features

"2. Inhabited Area

"3. Roads

"4. Communications

"5. Harbors

"6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation

"7. Meteorological Observations

"8. Military Affairs

"9. Customs

"10. Arrangements and Dispositions on the
part of U.S.S.R. Authorities.

"Table of the Meteorological Statistics No. 1."

The data gathered as the result of meteorolog-
ical observation conducted during three years, that
means 1935, 1936 and 1937, are included into the table
of meteorological data of Palana district. The second
and the following chapters include the same military

1 data and other paragraphs similar to those given in
2 Chapter 1.

3 Generals and officers, many of whom for a
4 long time served in the Kwantung Army and held high
5 posts in the Kwantung Army Headquarters or were com-
6 manding Generals of fronts and army commanders, were
7 interrogated about the Manchurian military base.

8 If your Honor please, I shall quote an
9 excerpt from prosecution document No. 1950, exhibit
10 No. 699, which I have earlier submitted -- affidavit
11 of MIYAKE, Mitsuharu, Lieutenant General retired,
12 former Chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters from
13 July, 1928 to May, 1932. MIYAKE came to Manchuria
14 again in 1940.

15 CLERK OF THE COURT: May I correct --

16 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now for
17 fifteen minutes.

18 (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was
19 taken until 1105, after which the pro-
20 ceedings were resumed as follows:)
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 CLERK OF THE COURT: The excerpt which was
4 just read from prosecution's document No. 2550
5 will be given exhibit No. 721-A.

6 (Whereupon, the above-mentioned
7 document was marked prosecution's exhibit
8 No. 721-A and received in evidence.)

9 COLONEL IVANOV: I continue. Characteriz-
10 ing the changes which took place in the preparation
11 of the military base from 1932 through 1940, i. s.,
12 during the time of his absence, MIYAKE testified:

13 I quote page 5 of MIYAKE's affidavit.

14 "Those changes are as follows: a remarkable
15 increase of Japanese troops in the districts near the
16 Soviet frontier, the establishment of new railroads
17 and highways toward the Soviet frontiers and the
18 construction of airfields, military warehouses and
19 barracks in such regions of operations as were re-
20 garded important for the waging of a war against the
21 Soviet Union."

22 I tender in evidence prosecution document
23 No. 2152 -- the affidavit of Lieutenant General
24 MURAKAMI, Keisaku, Commanding General of the Third
25 Army, which was included into the Kwantung Army, to

1 show that Japan constructed in Manchuria a military
2 base.

3 I present a certificate of the illness of
4 MURAKAMI, in connection with which he could not be
5 brought here before this Tribunal.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

7 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, I object
8 to part of this, at least, of this affidavit going
9 in evidence, and I particularly object to the ques-
10 tions which appear in the following pages:

11 On page 2, the second question from the bottom.
12 That question refers to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904.
13 There is an inference in that question that the attack
14 at that time was contrary to international laws that
15 existed at that time, which, of course, is not in
16 accordance with the opinions of writers on inter-
17 national law. Furthermore, the entire question of
18 the Russo-Japanese War is without the scope of this
19 Indictment. If the Tribunal is going to permit the
20 prosecution to go into that, we object to this ques-
21 tion on the grounds that it assumes something that
22 has to be proven.

23 I also object to the second question on
24 page 5. This question assumes a fact which is not
25 in evidence and is quite debatable.

1 I also object to the last question and answer
2 on page 5: "Whom do you consider to be the most im-
3 portant war criminals?" was the question that was
4 asked. In the first place, this witness is not
5 qualified as either a lawyer or a judge or a student
6 of international law; and in the second place, there
7 is no evidence, at least there has been no conclusion
8 up to the present time that there were or are any war
9 criminals. That is a fact to be determined by the
10 Tribunal.

11 This witness is being used by the prosecu-
12 tion for the purpose of usurping the functions of the
13 Tribunal. I really think that the Tribunal -- I think
14 the Tribunal should not, and I hope that they do not,
15 give any probative value to the answer by this witness
16 to that question.

17 THE PRESIDENT: Minister Golunsky.

18 MR. GOLUNSKY: If the Tribunal please, if one
19 reads attentively the question on page 2 objected to
20 by the defense, you will see that there is nothing
21 whatever about the actions of Japan being in conformity
22 or not in conformity with international law. The only
23 thing mentioned here is that the mere fact that Japan
24 attacked Russia without declaring war, which is gener-
25 ally known.

1 As to the second point of the objection, that
2 the question deals with matters outside of the scope
3 of the Indictment, the question refers to the teaching
4 and military academy of Japan of which the deponent
5 was a professor; we contend that it is relevant to the
6 case how the students of this academy were taught on
7 this matter.

8 As to the objections to the questions on
9 page 5, the first question, if you read the answer
10 to the question, you will see that the deponent just
11 tells what he knows about that fact; and that the
12 answer has in no way been influenced by the form of
13 the question.

14 As to the last question on page 5, I agree
15 that the question called for an opinion of the wit-
16 ness, but the witness, being a Commander of a Japanese
17 Army and previously a Professor of a military academy
18 and a Director of Tokyo War Institute, is of such
19 qualification that his opinion on this matter might
20 be of interest to the Tribunal.

21 MR. LOGAN: May I answer the prosecutor
22 briefly, your Honor?

23 THE PRESIDENT: There is no occasion to.
24 The objections, in the opinion of a majority of the
25 Tribunal, are well taken and are sustained. So far

1 as the answers are responsive to the questions dis-
2 allowed, they are disregarded. Subject thereto, the
3 document is admitted on the usual terms.

4 Have you something to say, Major?

5 MR. BLAKENEY: If we may be permitted to see
6 the certificate of illness of the witness, we may
7 possibly have additional objections.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is not an ob-
9 jection really, is it?

10 (Whereupon, a document was handed
11 to Major Blakeney.)

12 MR. BLAKENEY: We wish merely to reserve
13 our right to object at the proper time on the ground
14 this is not a medical certificate.

15 THE PRESIDENT: A copy of that certificate
16 should be given to the judges.

17 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
18 No. 2152 will receive exhibit No. 722.

19 (Whereupon, the above-mentioned docu-
20 ment was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 722
21 and received in evidence.)

22 THE PRESIDENT: The certificate is an exhibit
23 also.

24 CLERK OF THE COURT: And the certificates
25 that will be attached thereto with the same exhibit

1 number.

2 COLONEL IVANOV: Concerning the preparation
3 of the Manchurian military base by Japan for an attack
4 on the Soviet Union, MURAKAMI testified as follows:

5 I quote paragraph 3 on page 4.

6 "A. I know that in 1942 there was a plan of
7 an attack on the Soviet Union from the Manchurian
8 military base. The strength of the Kwantung Army
9 had been increased beforehand for this purpose, high-
10 ways and strategic railroads had been constructed,
11 about two hundred airfields had been constructed, as
12 well as fortified areas, ammunition dumps, many plants.
13 As for instance, in Mukden, a tank, an automobile and
14 an aircraft plant, in Laiyang -- a plant for pro-
15 duction of explosives."

16 If your Honor please, I shall quote extracts
17 from prosecution document No. 1970 (Exhibit No. 703),
18 which has been submitted earlier, the affidavit of
19 General USHIROKU, Jun, Commanding General of the
20 Kwantung Army third front.

21 MR. FURNESS: If the Court please, the de-
22 fense requests that this witness be called for cross-
23 examination unless further certificate showing the
24 nature of the illness and the seriousness of it is
25 furnished this Tribunal.

1 MR. GOLUNSKY: If the Tribunal please, this
2 witness being now in the Soviet Union, we have re-
3 ceived the news of his illness by telegraph. It will
4 take quite a time for a medical certificate to come
5 here. As soon as we will receive it, we will submit
6 it to the Tribunal.

7 MR. FURNESS: I think yesterday the Tribunal
8 ordered the witness who was in a similar position,
9 for whom a similar certificate of illness had been
10 filed, be produced. We request the same procedure
11 here.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Well, this witness has said
13 some very important things, but after the allowance
14 of Mr. Logan's objection the importance of his evi-
15 dence is not so apparent. However, we will reserve
16 consideration of the application. We judge of his
17 importance mainly on what Colonel Ivanov proposed
18 to read, and on what we heard from Mr. Logan in the
19 course of his objections. We have not read the whole
20 of the affidavit yet.

21 MR. FURNESS: Then, perhaps, we should renew
22 our application after the Court has had the chance to
23 read the entire document, which is in evidence.

24 THE PRESIDENT: We will consider your applica-
25 tion, but in case we should overlook it, which is most

1 unlikely, you may remind us of it.

2 MR. FURNESS: We would also like information
3 from the prosecution as to the status of this witness,
4 whether he is an ordinary prisoner of war, an accused
5 war criminal on trial, or under sentence.

6 MR. GOLUNSKY: Shall I answer this?

7 THE PRESIDENT: A majority of the Tribunal
8 requires you to answer that.

9 MR. GOLUNSKY: I beg your pardon?

10 THE PRESIDENT: The majority of the Tribunal
11 desires you to answer that.

12 MR. GOLUNSKY: What I know is that at the
13 time this affidavit was taken he was an ordinary
14 prisoner of war. I have no knowledge that his status
15 has been somehow changed; but if the Tribunal wants
16 me to make a definite statement on this point, I
17 shall have to make inquiries.

18 THE PRESIDENT: A majority of the Tribunal
19 desires that the information be given.
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1 COLONEL IVANOV: In reply to the question:
2 "What railway was being built when you were in charge
3 of railway superintendence in Manchuria during 1932
4 to 1934," USHIROKU testified (I quote page 2):

5 "A Constructions were begun in 1932 on the
6 Hailun-Paian-Taian Railway, Laha-Harbin and Tunhua-
7 Tumonkiang Railway; I do not remember the exact date
8 of their completion, but I think they were completed
9 in about two years.

10 "Q Did these railways have any strategic value?

11 "A They had strategic value.

12 "Q Give detailed accounts of the strategic value
13 of these railways.

14 "A These railways, from the viewpoint of strategy,
15 were directed against the Soviet Union and contribu-
16 tions towards troop movements and smooth transportation
17 of munitions were very effective."

18 I offer in evidence prosecution document
19 No. 2238, the affidavit of YANAGITA, Genzo, Lieutenant
20 General of the Japanese Army, former Chief of the
21 Harbin Military Mission. The document is tendered to
22 prove that a military base was being constructed in
23 Manchuria.
24

25 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution document

1 No. 2238 will receive exhibit No. 723.

2 (Whereupon, the document above referred
3 to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 723, and
4 received in evidence.)

5 COLONEL IVANOV: Allow me to quote certain
6 extracts from his affidavit. Naming the persons who
7 directed the creation of the Manchurian military base,
8 YANAGITA said (I quote page 4, paragraph 3 and further):

9 "A First of all, the commanders of the Kwantung
10 Army took part in this affair. At the time of the
11 Manchurian occupation, General HONJO was in command of
12 the Kwantung Army. Next Marshal MUTO (who died soon
13 thereafter), General HISHIKARI (till 1934), General
14 MINAMI (till 1935), General UEDA (1936 to 1939, resigned
15 taking to himself the responsibility for the NOMONHAN
16 Incident), Lieutenant General UMEZU, who was appointed
17 as UEDA's successor, served until 1944, summer, when he
18 was appointed Chief of the Army General Staff. His
19 successor, General YAMADA, filled the post till the
20 unconditional surrender.

21 "Q What kind of agencies took the leadership in
22 establishing military base in Manchuria?

23 "A The Army General Staff, the War Ministry and
24 the Greater East Asiatic Affairs Ministry."

25 I shall read quotations from prosecution

1 document No. 2239, exhibit No. 670, which has earlier
2 been submitted to the Tribunal, the affidavit of TAKABE,
3 Rokuzo, former Vice Prime Minister in the so-called
4 Manchoukuo and Chief of the General Affairs Department.
5 Important part played by this Department was shown to
6 the Tribunal by witnesses TANAKA, Ryukiti and Pu-Yi who
7 have been interrogated here, pages 1995 and 4020 of
8 the record of the proceedings of the Tribunal.

9 THE PRESIDENT: Major Furness.

10 MR. FURNESS: Referring to exhibit 723, we
11 request that the affiant, YAMAGITA, Genzo, be called
12 for cross-examination.

13 THE PRESIDENT: It is always a condition that
14 the affidavit is accepted on the terms that the
15 deponent will be called if the Court so requires. In
16 most cases, and I think in this also, we desire to
17 read the affidavit first before coming to any conclu-
18 sion.

19 MR. FURNESS: We make that request and request
20 the Court to rule on it after it has read the affidavit.

21 THE PRESIDENT: The application will be con-
22 sidered.

23 MR. FURNESS: We also request information as
24 to the status of this witness, whether he is a prisoner
25 of war, an accused war criminal on trial or under

1 sentence.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Well, we expect the prosecu-
3 tion to give you that information in the interest of
4 the prosecution so as to remove any possibility of
5 suspicion.

6 Colonel Ivanov.

7 COLONEL IVANOV: I shall read the extracts from
8 the affidavit of TAKABE, Rokuzo, page 1:

9 "Q What was the purpose of the Japanese occupa-
10 tion of Manchuria?

11 "A. The most important aim of the Japanese
12 occupation of Manchuria was to build up a military
13 base on the continent.

14 "Q Against what country was this base built?

15 "A. Mainly against the U.S.S.R. and China.

16 "Q Where did you find out that the aim of the
17 Japanese occupation of Manchuria was to make Manchuria
18 a military base against the U.S.S.R. and China?

19 "A This was the opinion of the Japanese
20 political leaders and the Kwantung Army. I know that
21 the problem of preparing for a war against the U.S.S.R.
22 was discussed at the headquarters of the Kwantung Army.
23 I heard about it from the Commanders of the Kwantung
24 Army, generals UMEZU, UEDA, MINAMI, and Lieutenant
25 General IKEDA."

1 I omit a part of the document and resume read-
2 ing from paragraph 2 on page 2:

3 "Q From whom and what kind of orders did you
4 receive concerning the operation of the base of opera-
5 tion against the U.S.S.R. within Manchuria?

6 "A The Kwantung Army kept its military plan secret,
7 but it demanded the government to take up many kinds
8 of measures in political and economical administration.

9 "Q From whom and what kind of orders did you
10 receive?

11 "A First I received orders from the Kwantung
12 Army concerning the first and second plans on develop-
13 ing Manchuria. The main points of this plan are to
14 develop industry, to supplement the demands of the
15 Kwantung Army, to set up railways and roads which can
16 be useful in the case of a war breaking out against
17 the U.S.S.R., and to prepare a food base.

18 "Q The ultimate aim was for Japan to prepare an
19 economical base for operations against the U.S.S.R.,
20 wasn't it?

21 "A Yes, it was for an attack against the U.S.S.R."

22 I skip one question and one answer and continue
23 to quote the same on the second page:

24 "Q From whom and what kind of orders did you
25 receive concerning the preparation of the base for a

1 war against the U.S.S.R.?

2 "A After all, the political and economical
3 demands of the Kwantung Army to the government were the
4 preparation for a war against the U.S.S.R. I received
5 orders from the Commander (Generals of the Kwantung
6 Army UMEZU and YAMADA), Chiefs of Staff (Lieutenant
7 Generals KIMURA, YOSHIMOTO, KASAHARA, and HATA),
8 Assistant Chief of Staff (Lieutenant Generals HATA
9 and IKEDA), and Chief of the Fourth Section (Colonels
10 KUROKAWA and OBI)."

11 Now I shall quote excerpts from page 4,
12 paragraph 5:

13 "Q Was the National Service Law of Showa 14 (1939)
14 in Manchuria proposed by the Japanese?

15 "A The National Service Law was proposed by the
16 Kwantung Army, and it was made by the demand of UEDA,
17 Commander of the Kwantung Army.

18 "Q What was the reason for this demand?

19 "A The reason was that it was necessary to have
20 a large army for the war against the U.S.S.R."

21 Further TAKABE speaking on the period of the
22 war between Germany and the Soviet Union made the
23 following statement on the using of the forced labor
24 of the Manchurian population by Japan for the construc-
25 tion of the military base. When TAKABE was asked who

1 carried out the mobilization of manpower in Manchuria,
2 he said (I quote, page 4):

3 "A The mobilization of the laborers was enforced
4 in compliance with the Kantokuen plan according to two
5 ways. One was by supplying in the administrative way,
6 and the other was supplying by the Labor Service Law.
7 More than a million people were mobilized every year."

8 I must explain that "Kantokuen" is a ciphered
9 title of the plan of speedy military preparations which
10 were carried out in the summer and autumn of 1941 after
11 Germany had attacked the Soviet Union, to put the
12 Kwantung Army in readiness for military actions. The
13 detailed information on this plan will be submitted to
14 the Tribunal by my colleague, Colonel Rosenblit.

15 THE PRESIDENT: Major Blakeney.

16 MR. BLAKENEY: I am sorry to interrupt, but
17 we must object to this type of testimony by the prosecu-
18 tion.

19 THE PRESIDENT: You didn't hear all he said.

20 MR. BLAKENEY: I heard all that came over the
21 phones, sir.

22 THE PRESIDENT: He said the details of that
23 plan that you have in mind would be given later. We
24 agree with you that evidence must be given.

25 COLONEL IVANOV: I continue to quote the

1 affidavit of TAKABE, page 4:

2 "Q How long was the term of this mobilization?
3 And in what way was it realized?

4 "A The mobilization of the laborers was compulsory.
5 They were mobilized for from four to six or eight
6 months. By the Labor Service Law youths of 21 to 23
7 years of age were mobilized and by executive order
8 people were mobilized regardless of age.

9 "Q By whose proposal was the mobilization carried
10 out?

11 "A It was carried out by the proposal of UMEZU."
12 Labor conscription was introduced in Manchuria in
13 1943 and included the whole population of the country.
14 It was done because hundreds, thousands and millions of
15 workers were necessary for construction of military objec-
16 tives and for the Japanese war industry in Manchuria.

17 TAKABE stated (I quote, page 4, paragraph 9):

18 "A The mobilization of laborers by the Labor
19 Service Law was enforced in Manchuria in Showa 18,
20 (1943). Its purpose was mainly to fill deficiency of
21 laborers in the military production factories."

22 The information on the military preparations
23 of Japan for a war against the Soviet Union would not
24 have been complete, if we would have satisfied ourselves
25 with the data concerning the Manchurian military base.

1 The Korean military base for a long time played an
2 important role in the preparations of Japan for an
3 attack against the Soviet Union. We shall present to
4 the Tribunal the systematized information of the Red
5 Army General Staff on the development of the Korean
6 military base after the occupation of Manchuria.

7 I offer in evidence prosecution document No. 1885,
8 the table of the increase of the strength of the Japanese
9 troops in Korea from 1931 to 1945.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

11 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution document
12 No. 1885 will receive exhibit No. 724.

13 (Whereupon, the document above referred
14 to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 724 and
15 received in evidence.)

16 COLONEL IVANOV: As this document shows, the
17 strength of the Japanese troops in Korea increased from
18 30,000 men in 1931-1932 up to 120,000 men in 1941-1942,
19 and up to 360,000 men in 1945. In 1931-1932 the Korean
20 Army had only two divisions, but in 1945 it already had
21 nine divisions.

22 In 1931-1932 the Korean Army had 300 pieces
23 of ordnance, in 1941-1942, 800, and in 1945, 1500 pieces
24 of ordnance.

25 In 1931-1932 the Korean Army had no tanks,

26 kilometers of highways, half of them paved.

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20 Army had only two divisions, but in 1945 it already had
21 nine divisions.

22 In 1931-1932 the Korean Army had 300 pieces
23 of ordnance, in 1941-1942, 800, and in 1945, 1500 pieces
24 of ordnance.

25 In 1931-1932 the Korean Army had no tanks,

1 and in 1945 it already had 170 tanks. The number of
2 planes in these years increased from 70 up to 400.

3 I offer in evidence document No. 2129, infor-
4 mation on the increase of the railroads and highways
5 in Korea from 1931 to 1945.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

7 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
8 No. 2129 will receive exhibit No. 725.

9 ("hereupon, the document above referred
10 to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 725 and
11 received in evidence.)

12 COLONEL IVANOV: I quote excerpts from this
13 document, paragraph 1, page 1:

14 "The general length of railroads in Korea at
15 the beginning of 1931 was 3,865 kilometers; they were
16 single lines and partially narrow-gauge railroads."

17 Now I shall quote paragraphs 2 and 3 on page 1:

18 "The length of highways by the beginning of
19 1931 was about 16,000 kilometers, out of them 6,000
20 kilometers of automobile roads.

21 "In 1941 the general length of railroads in
22 Korea was 2,000 kilometers more and the length of the
23 highways increased more than three times, and amounted
24 to about 5,800 kilometers of railroads and to about 53,000
25 kilometers of highways, half of them automobile roads."

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1 COLONEL IVANOV: It shows that in 1931-1932
2 the number of airfields in Korea was 8; in 1941-1942,
3 21; and in 1945, 25. Taking into consideration the
4 number of air bases and landing grounds we can say
5 that the total number of all airfields in Korea in 1931
6 was 8, in 1941, 53, and in 1945, 63.

7 The development of the airfields system in
8 Korea in those years is shown on the outline maps
9 presented to the Tribunal.

10 I present in evidence prosecution document
11 No. 2131 on the construction of fortified districts
12 in Korea, which shows that before 1932 Korea had only
13 several coast fortifications.

14 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

15 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
16 No. 2131 will receive exhibit No. 727.

17 (Whereupon, the document above referred
18 to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 727 and
19 received in evidence.)

20 COLONEL IVANOV: In connection with the
21 preparations of Japan for a war against the U.S.S.R.
22 the Japanese command started large-scale construction
23 of the fortified districts on the northeastern and
24 eastern coasts of Korea. I quote extracts from this
25 document:

1 "In 1936 the Japanese started construction of
2 the Rashin fortified area, that covered the whole coast
3 from Yuki up to Seisin inclusive. From 1940 to 1941
4 the Japanese started the construction of the Kenshin
5 fortified area, which was a continuation of the Rashin
6 fortified area northward and which included the right
7 bank of the river Toumintsyau from its mouth to the
8 town of Kenshin.

9 "By 1945 the Rashin and Kenshin fortified
10 areas were equipped with a ramified net of permanent
11 and field constructions. In the Rashin fortified area
12 there were up to fifteen batteries of large calibre
13 artillery and in that of Kenshin up to 55 guns and over
14 100 machine guns in pill-boxes.

15 "In 1936-1937 an intensive construction of
16 the Genzan fortified area was started, which covered
17 the entire coast of the Eiko Bay and the islands in
18 this bay."

19 Besides, the construction of fortified dis-
20 tricts was being carried out in the Tsinkai, Tsenanpo
21 and Reisui areas.

22 I now offer in evidence prosecution document
23 No. 2127 which gives information on the construction
24 of military dumps in Korea from 1931 to 1945.

25 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

1 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
2 No. 2127 will receive exhibit No. 728.

3 (Whereupon, the document above referred
4 to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 728 and
5 received in evidence.)

6 COLONEL IVANOV: I quote from the document,
7 page 1, paragraph 2:

8 "After the occupation of Manchuria, Korea
9 became a rear supply base for the Kwantung Army; in
10 connection with the preparations of Japan for a war
11 against the U.S.S.R. the number and capacity of dumps
12 in Korea, and the accumulation of war supplies, there,
13 were rapidly increasing.."

14 As it can be seen from the document, the
15 military dumps in Korea in 1931 could store ten or
16 fifteen division sets of ammunition, in 1941, 50, and
17 in 1945, 150 division sets of ammunition.

18 The increase of the number of military dumps
19 in Korea and their location are clearly shown on the
20 maps presented to the Tribunal. The thickest net of
21 different military dumps was in the northern part of
22 Korea.

23 I tender in evidence prosecution document
24 No. 2150 on the increase of barrack facilities in
25 Korea, from 1931 to 1945.

1 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

2 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
3 No, 2150 will receive exhibit No. 729.

4 (Whereupon the document above referred
5 to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 729 and
6 received in evidence.)

7 THE PRESIDENT: It is now noon. We will
8 adjourn to 1:30.

9 (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was taken.)
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AFTERNOON SESSION

The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330.

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Ivanov.

COLONEL IVANOV: I quote from this document. I quote document No. 2150.

"From 1931 to 1941 the barrack facilities in Korea increased more than three times with capacity to seven infantry divisions could have been billeted there, five of which could have been billeted in Northern Korea. From 1941 to 1945 the Japanese continued to build barracks and military settlements all over the country. During this period the billeting capacity of the barrack facilities in Korea was increased for receiving about twelve divisions together with support units."

The increase of the number of barracks in Korea and their location are clearly shown on the maps of barrack facilities in Korea, submitted to the Tribunal.

Now we shall present evidence which will prove that Japan according to treaties concluded between her

1 and our country took upon herself obligations not to
2 carry out military measures in Korea and Manchuria.

3 I quote Article 2 of the Portsmouth Treaty
4 of 1905, already presented to the Tribunal (exhibit
5 No. 21).

6 "In order to avoid all course of misunder-
7 standing the two High Contracting Parties will abstain,
8 on the Russo-Korean frontier, from taking any military
9 measures which may menace the security of Russian or
10 Korean Territory."

11 Now I shall quote Article 3 of the Portsmouth
12 Treaty:

13 "ARTICLE III - Japan and Russia mutually
14 engage:

15 "1. To evacuate completely and simultaneously
16 Manchuria, except the territory affected by the lease
17 of the Liaotung Peninsula, in conformity with the provi-
18 sions of additional Article I, annexed to Treaty;

19 "2. To restore entirely and completely to the
20 exclusive administration of China all portions of Man-
21 churia now in the occupation or under the control of
22 the Japanese or Russian troops, with the exception of
23 the territory above mentioned."
24
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1 The following is said in Article 7 of the
2 Portsmouth Treaty:

3 "Article VII - Japan and Russia engaged to
4 exploit their respective railways in Manchuria ex-
5 clusively for commercial and industrial purposes and
6 in no wise for strategic purposes."

7 Now I shall present to the Tribunal evidence
8 of the fact that creating a material base for an
9 attack against the Soviet Union the Japanese mili-
10 tarist ruling clique was simultaneously carrying
11 on ideological and military training of the popu-
12 lation of Manchoukuo for an aggressive war against
13 the Soviet Union and mobilizing elements hostile to
14 the Soviet State with the same aims.

15 If the Tribunal please I shall read extracts
16 from Prosecution document No. 1950 (exhibit No. 699)
17 which has earlier been presented, the affidavit of
18 Lt. General MIYAKE, Mitsuharu.

19 From December, 1940, to the day of the
20 surrender of Japan, MIYAKE was chief of the Central
21 Headquarters of the "Kyo-Wa-Kai" (the Concordia
22 Society) of the Manchurian Empire.

23 MIYAKE testified as follows. I quote page 5
24 of the affidavit:
25

 "The chief functions of the KYO-WA-KAI were

1 to mobilize all Manchurians so that we might secure
2 the regime established by Japan after the occupation
3 of MANCHURIA in 1931. It was required of all Man-
4 churians to work hard, to make MANCHURIA an important
5 foundation for JAPAN in the continent, especially
6 to strengthen it as a base against the SOVIETS.
7 For that purpose KYO-WA-KAI made widespread prop-
8 aganda, gave military training to its members,
9 especially to the youth, made positive efforts
10 for the development of Manchurian Industries
11 especially that of munitions, participated in the
12 construction of military installations under the
13 direction of the respective military headquarters
14 and organized special military groups for war-time
15 operations named 'SEMPO DAN' (The Vanguard of the
16 Army)."

17 Answering the question whose initiative
18 was it to create the "Kyo-Wa-Kai" MIYAKE said:
19 (I quote on page 6.)

20 "The idea of this Society was first dis-
21 closed in 1931, the organizers of which were the
22 KWANTUNG ARMY Staff, especially the Commander
23 HONJO, and me, the Chief of Staff at the time.
24 And so I was asked to become the head of the
25 Central Head-Office of that organization in 1940."

1 MIYAKE stated that in 1945 the number
2 of members of the "Kyo-Wa-Kai" organization
3 amounted to 4,500,000 people:

4 Speaking about the activities of the
5 "Sempo-Dan" groups which were formed in the Kyo-
6 Wa-Kai, MIYAKE said the following:

7 (I quote on page 8.)

8 "The general functions of the 'SEMPO DAN'
9 groups in ordinary times was to watch over the
10 Manchurians, to encourage them to work hard, and
11 to supervise those persons possessing anti-Japanese
12 feelings and in this way assist the MANCHUKUOAN
13 Government, while the chief duties during war-
14 time were such positive operations behind SOVIET
15 lines as terrorist acts, the executions of plots,
16 stratagems, the explosions of Railway lines,
17 bridges and military warehouses and killing and
18 wounding of SOVIET troops."

19 I quote an extract from Prosecution document
20 No. 2239 (exhibit No. 670) which has already been
21 presented to the Tribunal -- the affidavit of
22 TAKABE, Rokuzo, Chief of the General Affairs
23 Department of the Manchoukuo Government, I quote
24 an excerpt from this affidavit: (last paragraph
25 on page 4).

1 "Q What do you know about the KYO-WA-KAI?

2 "A I myself was a member of this association,
3 and also a member of the Central Headquarters
4 Committee. The leader of the KYO-WA-KAI was
5 Prime Minister CHANG, and the actual leader was
6 Lieutenant-General MIYAKE, Chief of Central Head-
7 quarters. The Central Headquarters Committee held
8 a meeting once a month. At this meeting the problems
9 concerning guidance of the Manchurian people were
10 discussed. For instance, the problem of the mobili-
11 zation of laborers: the Chinese disliked the law
12 of Labor Mobilization, so the mobilization of the
13 laborers had to be carried out with the aid of the
14 KYO-WA-KAI.

15 "Q By whose proposal was the KYO-WA-KAI
16 organized?

17 "A The KYO-WA-KAI was established by the
18 proposal of the Japanese, especially General HONJO,
19 former Commander of the Kwantung Army. In this
20 association, the Japanese held the position of
21 leaders and through this association the Japanese
22 thoughts were made known.

23 "Q How was the KYO-WA-KAI made use of for the
24 preparation of the war against the U.S.S.R.?

25 "A As mentioned before, the government received

1 orders concerning this from the Kwantung Army,
2 but the KYO-WA-KAI cooperated in making Manchuria
3 a base for preparations for a war against the
4 U.S.S.R."

5 I skip over one question and quote the
6 following one:

7 "Q How many members were there in the KYO-
8 WA-KAI?

9 "A There were more than 4,000,000."
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1 I present to the Tribunal prosecution docu-
2 ment No. 2364, the affidavit of Konstantin Vladimiro-
3 vich RODZAEVSKY, former Chief of the whiteguard organ-
4 ization "The Russian Fascist Union" in Manchuria,
5 to prove that Japan was preparing for the war against
6 the U.S.S.R.

7 At the same time I submit a certificate of
8 the Soviet Government stating that Rodzaevsky had
9 been sentenced to death on August 30, 1946.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Major Blakeney.

11 MR. BLAKENEY: In view of the statement of
12 the prosecution concerning the affiant, Rodzaevsky,
13 we should like to ask whether he is presently alive
14 or dead and whether he will be produced for cross-
15 examination.

16 THE PRESIDENT: Minister Golunsky.

17 MR. GOLUNSKY: Rodzaevsky was sentenced to
18 death at the same trial as Semionov, whose affidavit
19 has been submitted to the Tribunal the day before
20 yesterday. It was stated in the certificate handed
21 to the Tribunal that the sentence has been carried
22 out. The situation of Rodzaevsky is exactly the same
23 as with Semionov.

24 THE PRESIDENT: Major Blakeney.

25 MR. BLAKENEY: We wish to enter our strong

1 protest to the second example of a deliberate re-
2 moval of a witness whose testimony was known to be
3 material here. /s these instances multiply, we sub-
4 mit that the Tribunal must find that the reception
5 of this testimony is inconsistent with the barest
6 minimum of a fair trial.

7 MR. GOLUNSKY: If the Tribunal please, I
8 want only to object to the counsel's description of
9 the act of Soviet justice as "a deliberate removal
10 of a witness."

11 THE PRESIDENT: He did not say that the
12 purpose of the execution was to prevent the witness
13 giving evidence. I took him to mean that his death
14 was intentionally caused, as every execution does
15 cause death intentionally.

16 We decided by a majority some days ago to
17 admit the affidavit of a deponent who had been exe-
18 cuted before his affidavit was tendered. On the
19 other hand, where the deponent is believed to be
20 living, we insist, as a rule, upon an undertaking
21 that he will be produced for cross-examination if
22 directed by the Court. Here the deponent is living
23 but is under sentence of death.

24 I understand that I misapprehended what was
25 said. He has been executed. The position then is

1 the same as it was when a majority decided to admit
2 the affidavit for whatever probative value it had.
3 That decision applies here unless my colleagues de-
4 sire to review it. I have no intimation from any of
5 them that they do desire a review, so the affidavit
6 is admitted on the usual terms.

7 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's docu-
8 ment No. 2364 will receive exhibit No. 730.

9 (Whereupon, the document above
10 mentioned was marked prosecution's exhibit
11 No. 730 and received in evidence.)

12 THE PRESIDENT: The certificate of death
13 will be part of the exhibit.

14 COLONEL IVANOV: I quote the following
15 extracts from Rodzaevsky's affidavit, page 8, last
16 paragraph:

17 "The preparation for a war against the U.S.S.R.
18 was carried out in the sphere of ideological propa-
19 ganda among the Manchurian population. In order to
20 establish among the population faith in Japan and
21 hatred toward the Soviet Union, the Japanese immedi-
22 ately after the occupation of Manchuria created the
23 state political organization 'Kyo-Wa-Kai' (Common-
24 wealth of Nations) which propagated the idea of cre-
25 ating the Greater East Asia and of establishing in

1 this sphere the Japanese 'new order'. The 'Kyo-Wa-Kai'
2 Society carried out intense anti-Soviet propaganda among
3 the Chinese population and then began to spread it over
4 among the Russian whiteguards. The 'Kyo-Wa-Kai' in-
5 tensely propagated the anti-Soviet ideology at meetings
6 and in press.

7 "The activities were directed by the Japanese
8 Central Headquarters of the 'Kyo-Wa-Kai' Society, headed
9 in recent years by MIYAKE, Japanese General, who was
10 chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters at the time of
11 the occupation of Manchuria."

1 I present for identification to the Tri-
2 bunal prosecution document No. 2329 -- a book, pub-
3 lished in Kharbin in 1942 by the state organization
4 "Kyo-Wa-Kai" and the Chief Russian Emigrants Bureau
5 in the Manchurian Empire, under the title of "Great
6 Manchurian Empire" on account of her Ten-Year Jubilee.

7 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
8 No. 2329 will receive exhibit No. 731 for identifi-
9 cation only.

10 (Whereupon, the book "Great Man-
11 churian Empire" was marked prosecution's
12 exhibit No. 731 for identification.)

13 COLONEL IVANOV: The contents of the book
14 shows that the Japanese command paid great attention
15 to the ideological, organizational and military train-
16 ing of the Manchurian population for the purpose of
17 a war against the U.S.S.R.

18 I shall quote in evidence the most important
19 extracts from the book, "Great Manchurian Empire"
20 published by the "Kyo-Wa-Kai" Society.

21 THE PRESIDENT: The excerpt is tendered, I
22 take it. Admitted on the usual terms.

23 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
24 No. 2329, an excerpt from exhibit No. 731, will be
25 given exhibit No. 731-A.

(Whereupon, the document above
mentioned was marked prosecution's exhibit
No. 731-A and received in evidence.)

COLONEL IVANOV: The history of the Kyo-Wa-Kai is given in one of the chapters of the book. I shall quote some extracts from this chapter.

I quote on page 1:

"In April, 1932 (Dha-Tun-1st Year) in Mukden a special committee for the foundation of the Kyo-Wa-Kai was formed. The Committee was composed of: Colonel Itagaki, and others.

"The committee fulfilled their responsible mission with exceptional zeal and successfully accomplished it by elaborating the basic instrument of the Kyo-Wa-Kai and the plan of its activities." (page 170 of the book)

If the Tribunal please, I shall respectfully call their attention to the fact that the accused ITAGAKI was one of initiators of the "Kyo-Wa-Kai" (the Concordia Society).

It is said in the next extract: that in "Kyo-Wa-Kai" the post of supreme Adviser was accented by General HONJO, Commanding General of the Kwantung Army.

Basic principles of the establishment of the

1 "Kyo-Wa-Kai" Society, quoted in the book, were pub-
2 lished in 1933. I shall quote one of them as an ex-
3 ample: (I quote page 2)

4 "The ultimate purpose of Manchoukuo being a
5 State, in the existing international situation, is
6 the creation of a foundation so as to successfully
7 subserve the allied and friendly Nippon in her struggle
8 against the Anglo-Saxon world, as well as against the
9 Comintern aggression.

10 "In this holy struggle all the peoples of East
11 Asia must join to form the united front of the common
12 fight with the oppressors," (page 172 of the book)

13 Then follow other aims, similar to the first
14 one, which determine main purpose of "Kyo-Wa-Kai" activ-
15 ities and the following conclusion is given in the book.
16 (I quote page 2)

17 "Thus the Kyo-Wa-Kai, as is clear from the
18 above stated, has a special mission of great importance
19 to spread the spirit and the ideology of the State not
20 only among the entire population of Manchoukuo but
21 throughout the world. For the purpose of attaining
22 this great aim the Kyo-Wa-Kai must carry on a permanent
23 ideological struggle for the embodiment of its ideal
24 both inside and outside the State. The Kyo-Wa-Kai is
25 the ideological Centre of this struggle." (page 172

of the book)

1 The "Kyo-Wa-Kai" Society was a channel
2 through which the fascist racial ideas of the "New
3 Order" and of the domination of the Japanese nation
4 in Asia and in the whole world were spread. It was
5 sponsored by the Commanding General of the Kwantung
6 Army.

7 Further I shall quote page 2 which shows
8 what an active support gave the Japanese command to
9 the "Kyo-Wa-Kai" Society.

10 "It is necessary to say, that in certain
11 circles of the population there existed the opinion
12 that the Kyo-Wa-Kai was by nature a temporary organi-
13 zation. To dispel this wrong opinion General **MINAMI**,
14 General **NISHIO** and a number of other representatives
15 of higher authorities issued special directives con-
16 cerning the intrinsic nature of the Kyo-Wa-Kai."

17 The 8th All-Manchurian Congress of the "Kyo-
18 Wa-Kai" took place in October 1941, and it is said in
19 the description of the opening session. (page 3)

20 "His Majesty and the Commanding General of
21 the Kwantung Army honored with their presence the
22 ceremony of the opening session of the 7th Congress."

23 Here they speak of the defendant **UMEZU**.

24 If the Tribunal please I shall draw their
25

1 attention to the fact that the 8th Congress of the
2 "Kyo-Wa-Kai" was the first congress held after the
3 outbreak of the Soviet-German war, and whiteguard
4 delegates were invited to this Congress for the first
5 time.

6 I quote this description (page 205 of the
7 book, page 3 of the English translation).

8 "Four delegates of the Russian emigration
9 participated in the 8th Congress for the first time.
10 The twofold reasons for their having been absent at
11 the previous Congresses are as follows:

12 "Firstly, one of a technical nature -- lan-
13 guage difficulties.

14 "Secondly, at some places there were no
15 special Russian Sections of the Kyo-Wa-Kai. In the
16 course of time these obstacles had been removed and
17 several Russian delegates specially invited for the
18 occasion were able to take an active part in the pro-
19 ceedings of the 8th Congress."
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1 I shall quote comminque' on the Extraordin-
2 ary All-Manchurian Congress of the Kyo-Wa-Kai:

3 (I quote page 206 of the book, pages 3-4
4 of the English translation):

5 "On February 8, 1942, an All-Manchurian
6 Extraordinary Congress of the Kyo-Wa-Kai was called
7 by the Central Headquarters of the Kyo-Wa-Kai. The
8 session was opened in the premises of the Kyo-Wa-
9 Kaikan in Shinjin. The Congress was called in connec-
10 tion with the promulgation of His Majesty, the Emper-
11 or's Manifesto on the collaboration with the allied
12 Nippon Empire in her Holy-War for the Great East Asia.
13 The session was held two days."

14 As it can be seen from the next quotation
15 General UMEZU, the Special Envoy of the Japanese Empire
16 and Commanding General of the Kwantung Army, was pres-
17 ent at the Congress and addressed the Congress with a
18 directive. In his speech at this Congress UMEZU said
19 the following:

20 (I quote page 206 of the book, page 4 of the
21 English translation):

22 "His Majesty Tenno Granted his Manifesto
23 on the Declaration of War, on the same day His Majesty,
24 the Emperor's Manifesto was promulgated. All this
25 filled our hearts with a special happy feeling."

1 "The aim of the Great East Asiatic War is
2 to liberate East Asia from the baneful influence of
3 England and the U.S.A. and by joint efforts of the
4 East Asiatic nations to establish the New Order and
5 provide the possibilities for the states of East
6 Asia to bring into life the 'Khakko Itiu' idea and
7 their General prosperity.

8 "By this day the Nippon Imperial Army and
9 Navy have won a series of brilliant victories in the
10 Pacific Ocean and in compliance with His Majesty
11 Tenno's Gracious Decree, annihilated a number of
12 military bases of the enemy in East Asia, thus making
13 a gigantic stride towards the organization of the New
14 Order.

15 "However, to ensure the complete realiz-
16 ation of the purposes of the war and to secure the
17 prosperity of East Asia, we must go a long way. At
18 such an extraordinary historical moment the present
19 Congress is extremely opportune. The delegates to
20 the Congress must first of all pay their attention to
21 the general situation all over the world, and perceiv-
22 ing the grave significance of the international situ-
23 ation and tasks facing Manchoukuo they must take the
24 lead in the movement of raising the spirit of the
25 foundation of the state, for promotion in every way

1 the idea of sacrifice, for elucidating the masses as
2 to the great cause of the Holy War, for raising the
3 spirit of the masses, in this way helping increase
4 the national production and raise the might of the
5 State.

6 "On the other hand, basing themselves on the
7 principles of their common struggle and durable rela-
8 tions between Manchoukuo and Nippon the delegates
9 must contribute to the cause of national defense so
10 that Nippon might be sure so far as the rear is
11 concerned.

12 "Thus you must fulfill what you are
13 assigned and at the same time you will enjoy
14 His Majesty, the Emperor's great benevolence."
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1 Besides UMEZU, General MIYAKE, Chief of
2 the Central Headquarters of the "Kyo-"a-Kai" whose
3 testimony has already been read before the Tribunal,
4 held the floor at the extraordinary congress of the
5 "Kyo-"a-Kai." He, too, like UMEZU, had formulated the
6 task of "Kyo-"a-Kai" in war and had called upon
7 this organization "to popularize among the people
8 the meaning of the Greater East Asia War," and "to
9 live under the leadership of the spirit of New Order
10 in East Asia." Page 206 of the book.

11 I shall respectfully call the Tribunal's
12 attention to the following quotation which shows
13 that the occupation of Manchuria and the creation of
14 Manchukuo were looked upon as an example which was
15 followed by Fascist Germany. I quote page 1 of the
16 English translation:

17 "At present the great ideal of the founda-
18 tion of Manchukuo spreads all over East Asia and even
19 has its reflection in Europe. The political system
20 of our Ally Germany is undoubtedly influenced by the
21 ideas of the East."
22

23 I quote further: "One can say that the cre-
24 ation of Manchukuo, as it were, brought about spiritual
25 renovation to mankind." Page 61 of the book.

I quote one more extract describing the role

1 played by the "Kyo-Wa-Kai" in the construction of New
2 Order in the Greater East Asia which shows that sim-
3 ilar organizations were allotted in other countries
4 where the Japanese bayonets were establishing the
5 so-called "New Order." I quote page 2:

6 "Imperial Rule Assistance Association in
7 Nippon, the Renovation of Asia Union, the Committee
8 of Mobilization of Spirit in Korea, the Society of
9 Mobilization of Spirit on Formosa, the Renovation of
10 Asia Association in the Kwantung Region, Association
11 for Assisting the Throne on the South Islands, the
12 Orthodox Kuo-Ming-Dan in the Renovated China, Shin-
13 Ming-Khoi, the East Asia people's Union, the Kyo-Wa-Kai
14 of the Manchurian Empire -- These constitute the
15 powerful ideological front, which wins illustrious
16 victories on boundless land and sea stretches. It
17 must be said that the Kyo-Wa-Kai is righteously a
18 pioneer of the ideological front of the creation of
19 the New Order and the Renovation of the Great East
20 Asia." Page 182-183.

21 Many photos are placed in the book, "Great
22 Manchurian Empire." Due to technical difficulties
23 our request to reproduce these photos could not have
24 been fulfilled. We respectfully request, Mr. President
25 and Members of the Tribunal, to consider these

1 photos which characterize the direction of the
2 Kyo-Wa-Kai activities and the active role played
3 by the defendants, UMEZU, MINAMI, TOJO, ITAGAKI
4 and DOHIHARA in these activities.

5 The defense counsel can examine these
6 photos at the Secretariat of the Tribunal after the
7 Court adjourns.

8 On page 28 there are photos of the Commanding
9 General of the Kwantung Army, among which those of
10 General UMEZU and MINAMI.

11 THE PRESIDENT: Major Furness.

12 MR. FURNESS: This book is not in evidence.
13 It is merely marked for identification and cannot be
14 tendered unless we are supplied with copies. It is
15 merely marked for identification. That is all that
16 can be done under the rules of the Court.

17 MR. GOLUNSKY: If the Tribunal please, we
18 intended to process the photographs just in the same
19 way as we processed the excerpts from the book but it
20 proved it was technically impossible.

21 THE PRESIDENT: I have never known a photo-
22 graph to be used in this way. There is no question
23 of identity. Perhaps we had better leave the position
24 as it is. The book is not in evidence.

25 COLONEL IVANOV: Now I am going to present

1 to the Tribunal the evidence of the fact that the
2 Japanese military with full consent of the Japanese
3 ruling clique throughout the whole period were con-
4 ducting a war of sabotage against the U.S.S.R., con-
5 trary to the obligations taken by Japan in accordance
6 with the convention concerning basic principles of
7 the relations between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, signed
8 in Peking on January 20, 1925. This convention has
9 already been presented to the Tribunal, exhibit No. 31.

10 I quote Article 5 of this convention, page 2:

11 "Article V. The High Contracting Parties
12 solemnly affirm their desire and intention to live
13 in peace and amity with each other, scrupulously to
14 respect the undoubted right of a State to order its
15 own life within its own jurisdiction in its own way,
16 to refrain and restrain all persons in any governmental
17 service for them, and all organizations in receipt of
18 any financial assistance from them, from any act
19 overt or covert liable in any way whatever to endanger
20 the order and security in any part of the territories
21 of Japan or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

23 "It is further agreed that neither Contracting
24 Party shall permit the presence in the territories
25 under its jurisdiction -- (a) of organizations or
groups pretending to be the Government for any part

1 of the territories of the other Party, or (b) of
2 alien subjects or citizens who may be found to be
3 actually carrying on political activities for such
4 organizations or groups."

5 I respectfully beg your Honor to give
6 order to call witness KASAHARA to give evidence.
7 The witness is in the witness room.
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KASAHARA

1 Y U K I O K A S A H A R A, recalled as a witness
2 on behalf of the prosecution, resumed the stand
3 and testified as follows:

4 THE PRESIDENT: You are still on your oath.

5 COLONEL IVANOV: I present in evidence
6 prosecution document No. 2460.

7 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
8 No. 2460 was formerly given exhibit No. 698 for iden-
9 tification.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

11 ("hereupon, the document above
12 referred to was received in evidence.)

13 COLONEL IVANOV: If the Tribunal please,
14 I shall read the affidavit of KASAHARA, Yukio:

15 "Affidavit -- I, KASAHARA, Yukio, Lieutenant
16 General of the Japanese Army, testify under oath the
17 following:

18 "I was the Chief of Russian Section of the
19 Second Bureau of the Japanese General Staff in 1928"--

20 THE PRESIDENT: We are not clear as to what
21 your intention is, Colonel Ivanov.

22 COLONEL IVANOV: Yesterday I presented this
23 affidavit for identification. The witness confirmed
24 this affidavit yesterday but it was not read yesterday.
25 Now I am going to read it in evidence.

KASAHARA

1 THE PRESIDENT: I understand you are about
2 to read exhibit No. 697.

3 COLONEL IVANOV: Yes.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Proceed.

5 COLONEL IVANOV: I begin to read from the
6 beginning:

7 "I, Lieutenant General Yukio KASAHARA, state
8 under oath as follows:

9 "I was the Chief of Russian Section of the
10 Second Bureau of the Japanese General Staff in 1928.
11 I certify that I obtained knowledge of the following
12 matters during the said period, through my duties.

13 "In 1928, Major Masatane KANDA was on special
14 duty with the Harbin Special Mission. He served in the
15 Russian Section of the Second Bureau (Intelligence
16 Bureau) of the Japanese General Staff Office a little
17 previously. In the photostat copies of the Japanese
18 document consisting of fifty pages, entitled 'Military
19 Materials for the operations against U.S.S.R.' which
20 were shown to me I saw the following three items.

21 "1. Outline of sabotage activities against
22 U.S.S.R.

23 "2. Important sabotage activities matters
24 that would be carried out east of Siberia.

25 "3. Facilities to be stationed for the

KASAHARA

sabotage purposes east of Siberia and their operations.

1 "I saw the documents containing these three
2 items eighteen years ago. In other words, I saw that
3 part of the document beginning from the first to the
4 sixteenth page. That document was drawn up by Major
5 Masatane KANDA who was on duty in the said Harbin
6 Special Mission mentioned above.
7

8 "I saw the aforementioned part of that docu-
9 ment during the period when I was the Chief of the
10 Russian Section of the Second Bureau of the General
11 Staff Office; in other words, in 1928.

12 "In order to certify the above mentioned
13 matter, I put my own signature and date in my hand-
14 writing on the backs of the photostatic copies of the
15 portion of the said document which I saw in 1928.
16

17 "This affidavit is signed by me in my own
18 handwriting and it is true and accurate.

19 (Signed) Yukio KASAHARA."

20 Now I shall read the text of the speech.

21 Yesterday I presented for identification
22 document No. 2460. This document received exhibit
23 No. 698 for identification only. The document is a
24 photostatic copy of the secret materials for military
25 operations against the Soviet Union. In 1928 these

KASAHARA

1 materials in the form of a report were submitted to
2 the Kwantung Army Command and to the Japanese General
3 Staff by KANDA, Masatane, a prominent Japanese intel-
4 ligence service officer in Manchuria, who later on
5 was Chief of the Russian Section of the Japanese
6 General Staff and a Lieutenant General of the Japanese
7 Army.

8 I shall read in evidence extracts from
9 this document.

10 THE PRESIDENT: I take you to be tendering
11 the document.

12 Major Furness.

13 MR. FURNESS: If the Tribunal please, we
14 object to the admission of this document from pages
15 seven to the end since this witness has only identified
16 the first three chapters. His affidavit, exhibit No.
17 697, makes this clear in the three numbers to which he
18 refers about the middle of the page. The contents of
19 exhibit No. 698 tendered in evidence now are the same,
20 the only difference being in translation.

21 COLONEL IVANOV: I continue.

22 THE PRESIDENT: The document is admitted
23 to the extent that it is not questioned by the defense,
24 but we must hear something on the defense's objection.

25 MR. GOLUNSKY: We intend to tender in evidence

KASAHARA

only excerpts from the first three chapters identified by the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: The defense's objections are upheld. The document so far as admitted is admitted on the usual terms.

COLONEL IVANOV: On the back of the first page of this photocopy, Lieutenant General KASAHARA, to whom one copy of the document has been addressed, made the following inscription:

"I, KASAHARA, Yukio, Lieutenant General of the Japanese Army, testify the following:

"I saw three chapters of the document in the Japanese language, on fifty pages under the title, 'Materials for Military operations against the U.S.S.R.', photocopies of which were presented to me this day. These chapters are:

"1. General outline of sabotage activities against Russia.

"2. Chief matters of sabotage activities on the territory east of Siberia.

"3. Organizations to be established for carrying on sabotage activities on the territory east of Siberia, and their tasks.

"In other words, I saw the first sixteen pages of this document. It was drawn up by Major KANDA,

KASAHARA

1 Masatane, who at that time worked at the Kharbin
2 Special Service Agency. I saw the said part of the
3 document at the time when I was Chief of the Russian
4 Section of the Second Department of the General Staff,
5 that is, in 1928.

6 "To certify the said fact, I have put my
7 signature and date at the back of the photocopy of
8 the part of the document which I saw in 1928.

9 "KASAHARA, Yukio, September 4, 1946."

10 A plan of sabotage activities against the
11 U.S.S.R. in time of peace as well as in time of war
12 is worked out in detail in this report and also in
13 the appendix to it. Allow me to read in evidence
14 several extracts. The report has six parts, the titles
15 of which give general scope of these activities. I
16 quote these titles, page 1:

17 "1. General outline of sabotage activities
18 against Soviet Russia.

19 "2. Principal matters of sabotage activities
20 planned to be executed in the east of Siberia.

21 "3. Organizations to be established for the
22 purpose of sabotage activities in the areas east of
23 Siberia and their tasks."

24 I omit the names of the next titles.

25 Allow me to quote the first part of KANDA's

KASAHARA

1 report in full. This part shows the importance of
2 the sabotage activities against Russia, their main
3 purpose and scale. I quote, page 2:

4 First, "GENERAL OUTLINE OF SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES
5 AGAINST SOVIET RUSSIA.

6 "The position of sabotage activities in
7 future wars is very important, particularly when we
8 are unable to bring about the final decision in our
9 operations against Russia by force of arms, most part
10 of the war, from beginning to end, shall be a war of
11 sabotage.

12 "The affairs included in our sabotage activ-
13 ities against Russia are many and their activities
14 will extend throughout the whole world. Now, I shall
15 mention the general outline of affairs to be executed,
16 as follows:

17 "1. In the light of the present situation
18 in the Soviet Union, various strifes concerning race,
19 thought, and social classes shall be aggravated, es-
20 pecially the internal strifes among the Communist
21 Parties shall be invigorated in the hope of destructing
22 the national structure. Above all, it is necessary to
23 unite the states of Asiatic races in the Union in
24 opposition to European Russia.

25 "2. In relation to the preceding article,

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1 anti-war spirit will be instilled among the Russian
2 army, especially among troops of foreign races, so that
3 the Russians will commit errors in their plans of oper-
4 ations in the Far East.

5 "3. Threatening the Soviet Union by inducing
6 the neighboring countries in the west and the south,
7 we shall make it impossible for her to move large
8 troops to the Far East. Through economic blockade
9 the import of goods, especially of war materials, will
10 be checked.

11 "4. By destroying the transportation system
12 we shall delay the mobilization and assembling of
13 troops; and by creating disturbances in munition
14 plants we shall obstruct their manufacture of war
15 materials. The Siberian Railway is the most important
16 point.

17 "5. We shall isolate the Soviet Union by
18 destroying the communication facilities and through
19 wireless competitions. Special attention should be
20 paid to the Far East areas.

21 "6. Should any regime connected with the
22 Soviet Union exist in China, it shall be destroyed."

23 The second part of KANDA's report speaks on
24 principal measures which should be taken to carry out
25 sabotage activities. Manchuria and Mongolia are

considered by KANDA as a military base for a war
against the Soviet Union. I quote extracts from the
second part, page 3.

THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now for fifteen
minutes.

(Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was
taken until 1502, after which the proceedings
were resumed as follows:)

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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Ivanov.

4 COLONEL IVANOV: I quote extracts from the
5 second part, page 3:

6 "Russian territories east of Siberia, Man-
7 churia and Mongolia will be the zones of military
8 operations or form the background areas for both
9 armies, so there are very many matters for sabotage
10 activities in these areas. I shall now outline the
11 important matters as follows:

12 "1. Propaganda activities and instigation will
13 be executed in Russian territories east of Siberia
14 to instill anti-Communist and anti-Jewish spirits
15 among the inhabitants and troops, and anti-war move-
16 ments shall be provoked."

17 Skipping item 2, I proceed with item 3.

18 "3. Anti-Communist organizations will be set
19 up in South Manchuria, Korea, and Saghalien, and will
20 be made to advance into North Manchuria and Far East
21 Russian territories at favorable opportunities to
22 hamper operational activities of Russian troops. In
23 connection with the development of the general war
24 situation, an anti-communist regime will be established
25 within the Russian territory, and we shall contemplate

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1 the overthrow of the Communist Government both in the
2 Siberia and Caucasus areas.

3 "4. We shall hope to make Outer Mongolia
4 anti-Soviet."

5 I quote the last sentence from item 5:

6 "Should any pro-Soviet government be estab-
7 lished in North Manchuria, we shall first of all
8 scheme to overthrow it."

9 The following is a quotation from the intro-
10 ductory paragraph of the third part of KANDA's report,
11 page 4, paragraph 1:

12 "As the sphere of sabotage activities against
13 Russia extends throughout the world, its organization
14 should also cover both continents. We shall here
15 speak how the organizations will be established and
16 how they will carry out their activities in the Russian
17 territories east of Siberia and in Manchuria."

18 The third part of the report provides for
19 the creation of such organizations for the purpose of
20 sabotage activities against Russia and their tasks.
21 I enumerate the names of these organizations. I quote:

22 "1. Siberian Organizations, page 4.

23 "2. Chita Organization, page 4.

24 "3. Blagoveschensk Organization and Heiho
25 Organization, page 5.

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1 "4. Habarovsk Organization, page 5.

2 "5. Vladivostok Organization, page 5.

3 "6. Saghalien Organization, page 5.

4 "7. The North Korean Organization, page 6.

5 "8. The North Manchurian Organization, page 6.

6 "9. Taonan Organization, page 7."

7 I shall quote one more extract from this
8 report to show the contents of this part, which deals
9 with the main tasks of special Japanese organizations
10 in Northern Manchuria.

11 I quote page 6:

12 "The sabotage activities of the North Man-
13 churian Organization based in Habarovsk --"

14 THE RUSSIAN MONITOR: Correction: "based in
15 Harbin."

16 COLONEL IVANOV (Continuing): "based in Harbin
17 is complicated and divergent. I shall state the impor-
18 tant matters as follows:

19 "a. To completely seize the Chinese political
20 power. If a pro-Soviet government shall be established,
21 it shall, first of all, be overthrown.

22 "b. To get rid of all members of the Soviet
23 managing staff from the Chinese Eastern Railway, there-
24 by rebuking all red influence from North Manchuria.

25 "c. Manipulation of anti-revolutionary Russians

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1 and bandits, and destruction of rebellious Korean
2 organizations."

3 Now the defense may interrogate the witness
4 KASAHARA.

5 THE RUSSIAN MONITOR: Now the defense may
6 conduct cross-examination of the witness KASAHARA,
7 Yukio.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Dr. KIYOSE.

9 CROSS-EXAMINATION

10 BY DR. KIYOSE:

11 Q This document which you have just certified,
12 is this in the nature of a report made public, or is
13 it simply a private report of an investigation con-
14 ducted by you as an individual?

15 A For the reasons which I will state, it is an
16 individual research. On the first page it is written,
17 "Material for Research."

18 THE MONITOR: "First page" should read "the
19 cover."

20 A (Continuing): Secondly, the person -- the
21 name of the person who was sent the report is Major
22 KANDA of the War Ministry and is a private person's
23 name.

24 THE MONITOR: Who sent the report.

25 A (Continuing): The persons to whom this report

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1 was addressed are marked Colonel KAWAMOTO and Major
2 KASAHARA, myself, private individuals. By Army
3 regulations when a person in an organization makes
4 a report, this has to be sent to the Chief of the
5 organization in question.

6 THE MONITOR: In the name of the Chief of
7 the organization, in this case the Special Service
8 Group.

9 A (Continuing): As for the General Staff --
10 all official documents of the General Staff have to
11 be sent to the Chief of General Affairs of this General
12 Staff. If this had been an official document, it
13 should have been sent under the name of the Chief
14 of the Harbin Special Mission Service through the
15 Kwantung Army General Staff to the General Staff in
16 Tokyo.

17 THE MONITOR: The General Affairs Bureau of
18 the General Staff in Tokyo.

19 A (Continuing): Without these indications
20 it would not be an official document. For these
21 reasons this is not an official report. It is only
22 the result of a private research sent to a private
23 person; in this case, myself.

24 Q Do you know of any fact, do you know whether
25 or not it is a fact that this private investigation --

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1 this result of a private investigation conducted in
2 1928 was ever adopted by the General Staff as an
3 official policy?

4 THE MONITOR: "Plan" rather than "policy."

5 A No. I have received this as an individual
6 and also coming from a private source, and I have not
7 shown it to my superior officers.

8 Q In this same year, did you ever convey to --

9 THE MONITOR: I believe it was Colonel KAWABE.

10 Q (Continuing): --to Major KANDA through,
11 I believe it was Colonel KAWABE concerning the policy
12 to be adopted towards the Soviet Union?

13 THE MONITOR: Not "policy" but "problem."

14 A Yes, I have.

15 Q Is that the exhibit No. 702 which is there?
16 Did you send this to him before or after you had
17 received the report?

18 THE MONITOR: Send this message.

19 A This message was sent in 1932 --

20 THE MONITOR: The seventh year of Showa.

21 Q What is the meaning of the words "ninth year
22 of Showa, 1934, on this document?

23 A All the preparations should be ended by Showa
24 ninth -- it means that in case a war with the Soviet
25 should break out at that time --

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1 THE MONITOR: By that time.

2 A (Continuing): By that time we should be
3 fully prepared to meet the situation.

4 THE MONITOR: "Ninth year of Showa" is "1934."

5 Q Then the meaning was not to wage war, but
6 to be prepared in case a war should break out?

7 A Yes, it is so.

8 Q Was the purpose of this message also decided
9 officially, or was it again only a private communi-
10 cation?

11 A This was not formally decided. It was just
12 an agreement or a plan arranged between the principal
13 interested officers.

14 MR. GOLUNSKY: If the Tribunal please, I
15 understand the counsel is cross-examining the witness
16 not on the affidavit which has been read and not on
17 the document attached to this affidavit, but to the
18 document and the affidavit which were read yesterday
19 and on which the cross-examination has been completed.

20 THE PRESIDENT: I understood him to be sug-
21 gesting a distinction between private and official
22 documents and that what he says would apply to the
23 document in question now.

24 MR. GOLUNSKY: Yes, Mr. President, he started
25 his cross-examination with those questions, and then

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1 he started asking about the preparations of the war
2 against the Soviet Union to be ended by 1934; and
3 this is a point which has nothing to do whatsoever
4 with the document which was produced by the prose-
5 cution today. It refers to a document produced
6 yesterday on which the cross-examination was finished.

7 THE PRESIDENT: You must confine yourself
8 to the document in question today, the one that has
9 just been read.

10 BY DR. KIYOSE (Continued):

11 Q You have said concerning the document read
12 today that you saw only the first sixteen pages, and
13 that you have not read the latter part; but is that
14 document, then, divided into two parts?

15 A I do not think that it is divided into two
16 parts. I have only spoken of the part of which I have
17 a clear recollection. Of the other part I do not have
18 a very clear recollection.

19 THE MONITOR: Whether I had seen it or not
20 and so I had not included it in my affidavit.

21 Q Then you will not be able to state whether
22 the part of the report following page 16 was of an
23 official nature or not?

24 A From the general drift of the document, even
25 without looking at it, I can say that it is not of an

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1 official nature, from the work itself.

2 THE MONITOR: Having seen the first half of
3 the document and knowing that it was addressed by a
4 private individual to myself, and in a private capacity,
5 I can say without seeing the latter half of the docu-
6 ment that it also has no official nature.

7 DR. KIYOSE: I conclude my cross-examination.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Major Furness.

9 CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)

10 BY MR. FURNESS:

11 Q General KASAHARA, these plans -- unofficial
12 plans -- were more defensive than they were offensive
13 in nature, were they not?

14 MR. GOLUNSKY: If the Tribunal please, I
15 object to that sort of questioning because of the
16 leading character of the question.

17 THE PRESIDENT: He is not Major Furness'
18 witness, and Major Furness can lead him.

19 A It is not a question of whether it is
20 offensive or defensive. It is simply a question of
21 in case a war breaks out --

22 THE MONITOR: Such measures will be taken.

23 Q You first saw them in 1928, did you not?

24 A Yes, it is so.

25 Q And you do not know at all when the maker of

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1 this unofficial plan made his plan, do you?

2 A Generally speaking, judging from what is
3 written at the beginning of this report, it is in
4 that year.

5 Q The plans dealt, did they not, to a consider-
6 able extent with activities in territory which was
7 Japanese such as Korea?

8 A It is not only Korea. In case a war begins,
9 it would naturally follow that operations would be
10 pursued in every land in all sorts of regions.

11 THE MONITOR: And very similarly in other
12 countries also.

13 A (Continuing): That was also done in other
14 countries.

15 Q It included, did it not, Korea which was
16 then Japanese?

17 A Yes.
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1 THE PRESIDENT: Captain Brooks.

2 MR. BROOKS: Mr. Witness, as to this outline
3 of sabotage activities that you have discussed, were
4 any of these plans as outlined ever actually put into
5 effect against Russia?6 THE WITNESS: These weren't put into action
7 really; this is only a plan made by a private person.8 DR. KIYOSE: That concludes the defense's
9 cross-examination.

10 MR. GOLUNSKY: A couple of questions.

11 REDIRECT EXAMINATION

12 BY MR. GOLUNSKY:

13 Q What official position did Major KANDA hold
14 in the Japanese Army in 1928?15 A I don't know precisely but judging from this
16 document he was in the -- he was attached to the Special
17 Service Mission in Harbin.18 Q Was the working out of plans of this sort an
19 official business of the Special Service Mission at
20 Harbin?21 A I don't know exactly what were the duties of
22 the Harbin Special Service Mission. The commanding
23 officer, the general commanding the Kwantung Army
24 would give those orders. But as chief of the Russian
25 Section I know indirectly that the establishment of --

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REDIRECT

1 THE MONITOR: I don't believe that sabotage
2 plans were among the orders given, the drawing up of
3 sabotage plans were among the orders given to the Harbin
4 Mission by the commander in chief.

5 Q I didn't ask you what orders were given to
6 the Harbin Mission by the commander in chief. I asked
7 you what was the business of the Harbin Special Service
8 Mission.

9 MR. LOGAN: I submit to the Tribunal that the
10 witness has already answered that question in the first
11 part of his answer.

12 A The official duties of the Special Mission in
13 Harbin is the gathering of information.

14 Q Was the information contained in Major KANDA's
15 report of a secret nature?

16 A It isn't really of a confidential nature.

17 Q Was it considered permissible in the Japanese
18 Army to send secret information in private letters?

19 A Permission was not given, but a great deal of
20 latitude was recognized in this respect.

21 MR. GOLUNSKY: That is all.

22 THE PRESIDENT: The witness is released on the
23 usual terms.

24 (Whereupon, the witness was excused)

25 COLONEL IVANOV: I present to the Tribunal for

1 identification prosecution document No. 1682, entitled,
2 "Items Concerning the U.S.S.R. presented at the Con-
3 ference of Japanese Military Attaches in Europe."

4 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
5 No. 1682 will be given exhibit No. 732 for identifi-
6 cation.

7 (Whereupon, the document above referred
8 to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 732 for
9 identification only.)

10 COLONEL IVANOV: This conference was conducted
11 in Berlin in April, 1929, by the accused MATSUI, Ivane,
12 the then Chief of the Japanese General Staff Second
13 Department who arrived there. He admitted this during
14 his interrogation. If it is the wish of the Tribunal
15 we can present a corresponding excerpt from the
16 interrogation of MATSUI. Another defendant, HASHIMOTO,
17 Kingoro, as it is seem from the document, attended that
18 conference.

19 I shall present in evidence an excerpt from
20 this document.

21 THE PRESIDENT: Major Furness.

22 MR. FURNESS: Again we feel that the source
23 of this information as to who conducted this conference
24 should be in sworn evidence and not a mere statement by
25 the prosecutor. It differs in this respect from some

1 of the other cases in that he hasn't stated that any
2 evidence to this effect would be produced.

3 MR. GOLUNSKY: It was our opinion that the fact
4 that MATSUI admitted that this was a record of a con-
5 ference presided by him was sufficient for the identifica-
6 tion of the document.

7 MR. FURNESS: So far as we know, that isn't
8 in evidence as yet. There is also a statement with
9 regard to the defendant HASHIMOTO. The certificate
10 again merely states that the information comes from
11 the Red Prosecution, Red Army Chief of Military Prose-
12 cution Department, Moscow.

13 THE PRESIDENT: Is MATSUI's admission in
14 evidence or do you propose to prove it now?

15 COLONEL IVANOV: I submit to the Tribunal
16 for identification prosecution document No. 4107,
17 Interrogation of MATSUI, Iwane. I shall read excerpts
18 from this interrogation in evidence.

19 MR. FURNESS: I don't think, if your Honor
20 please, we have been served with these excerpts, and,
21 as far as I know, the defendant MATSUI's counsel is
22 not here because he did not know that any such paper
23 would be tendered in evidence at this time.

24 COLONEL IVANOV: In reply I can say that we
25 didn't expect to meet objections from the side of the

1 defense counsel and, therefore, in reply to those
2 objections we submitted this interrogation of the
3 Accused MATSUI.

4 THE MONITOR: For identification.

5 THE PRESIDENT: You should prove this admis-
6 sion of MATSUI's in order to meet the objection, but
7 the rules must be observed. So, we will recess now
8 until half past nine on Monday.

9 (Whereupon, at 1545, an adjournment was
10 taken until Monday, 14 October 1946, at 0930.)

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